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ABSTRACT
AN INVESTIGATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING WILLINGNESS TO
‘INTRODUCE THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM’
Mackenzie Michael Festa
One way of maintaining the quality of an accounting firm’s practice is for its professionals to
speak up when violation of policies and procedures is perceived or observed. Accounting firms
operate as a high performance workplace, which can produce an abusive supervisory
environment. I employ a quasi-experimental methodology to explore how accountants respond
to a violation of policies and procedures when an abusive supervisor is present. I examine how
the presence of a mentoring relationship independent of the supervisory assignment influences
the protégé’s willingness to voice a perceived violation. The findings indicate that abusive
supervisory behaviors suppress voicing behaviors of professionals. However, the mentor
relationship does not influence voicing intentions in this case. Additionally, the mentor
relationship does not moderate the abusive supervision voicing relationship. I contribute to both
the accounting, management, and psychology literatures by demonstrating that abusive
supervision lowers voicing, which can compromise quality in an accounting context.
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AN INVESTIGATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING WILLINGNESS TO
‘INTRODUCE THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM’
1.

Introduction
In front of over 400 faculty and students packed into McConomy Auditorium in August

2007, Dr. Pausch, a computer science professor at Carnegie Mellon University, introduced his
elephant in the room—a terminal cancer diagnosis in the bloom of his career. Dr. Pausch
succumbed to pancreatic cancer early the following year. When I applied to West Virginia
University’s Ph.D. in Business Administration program, I wrote a personal statement based
largely on Dr. Pausch’s last lecture “Really Achieving Your Childhood Dreams.” My graduate
education process has created an opportunity most Ph.D. candidates never experience. So, here
is my elephant in the room: I lived my dissertation. All the major aspects discussed in the
following sections derived from my personal experiences: (1) abusive supervision, (2) voicing,
and (3) a mentor that revealed to me that I had choices. I begin with a preamble that
encompasses my personal interest in this topic and use a narrative account from Mr. Robert
Boisjoly’s (1993) Accounting Horizons article to weave my ideas together.
1.1.

Preamble
I am passionate about historical events. In 1996, when I was in third grade, my teacher

gave the class a reading lesson that would capture my interests for years to come. The lesson
was on the Space Shuttle Challenger1 (Challenger) and its ascent failure 73 seconds into takeoff
of mission STS-51-L. I do not recall the specifics of the lesson, only my interest was so
compelling that I continued to learn about Challenger at every opportunity. When my Mom

1

The Space Shuttle Challenger was named after the HMS Challenger, a steam-assisted corvette of the British Royal
Navy. The HMS Challenger was commissioned to embark on the first global marine research expedition from
1872-1876. It was aptly named the Challenger expedition.

1

gauged my interest and suggested attending a weeklong space camp a couple of years afterward,
I jumped at the opportunity.
At space camp we learned about many of the technical (for fifth graders) aspects of space
travel, including the topic of launch failures. We watched the video of the Challenger explosion
and analyzed the communications that occurred prior to the tragedy. The weeklong camp
culminated in the Friday mission simulation. Our group of seven was asked to select a Space
Shuttle Mission Patch from a previous mission. My choice was easy; I honored the tenth
mission for Challenger, STS-51-L.
So, that morning we donned our space gear (smocks with our selected patches glued on
the sides) and crawled into our cabin (a three-room tent). We all also had our own roles. After
our ascent, Houston asked a group member to “stir the oxygen tanks” and “switch the carbon
dioxide tanks.” During that process, a glitch occurred. The replacement CO2 tank was damaged
during takeoff. A teammate quickly identified and removed the tank (remarkably similar to a 2liter Pepsi bottle) replacing it with the reserve tank.2 After returning to Earth, in our debriefing
with Houston, we learned that he saved the day simply by following policies and procedures and
maintaining the quality control standards in the cabin. Maintaining quality control standards
brought me back to why the Challenger explosion was ever allowed to happen. One of our team
members was able to prevent a disaster, at only 11 years old, because he observed quality control
practices and acted accordingly.
Seventeen years later, my interest piqued again when I was shown an article in
Accounting Horizons (Boisjoly, 1993) about the importance of personal integrity and
accountability that was authored by one of the Challenger engineers. It was a perspective on the

Prior to the launch, we were told there is a glitch on every mission. This “glitch” happened to be nearly identical
to the process astronaut Jack Swigert was going through prior to the Apollo 13 explosion (NASA, 2001).
2

2

Challenger launch that I had not yet heard. Ultimately, Boisjoly (1993) untangled and weaved
together different interests in my life that have led to this dissertation.
Robert M. Boisjoly3 was employed as an aerospace engineer for the NASA4 contractor
Morton Thiokol, Inc. (MTI).5 Mr. Boisjoly’s specialty area was on Space Shuttle Booster
Joints.6 These joints fit together with rubber seals that expand and contract to keep the fuel in
the rocket.7 Prior to the launch of Challenger, Mr. Boisjoly discovered that cooler temperatures
(less than 53 degrees Fahrenheit) caused the rubber seals to contract to the point where fuel could
escape, which would likely cause an external explosion. Cool temperatures nearly caused a
failure in the years leading up to mission STS-51-L. Six months prior to the Challenger launch,
Mr. Boisjoly wrote a portentous memo warning of the catastrophic loss of life that could occur in
a cool weather launch (Martin & Yee, 2012). MTI and NASA were keenly aware of the risks
that cool temperatures posed on a mission.
Prior to the launch of mission STS-51-L, Mr. Boisjoly and other engineers on his team at
MTI discussed the issues regarding launching in cold weather. Unseasonably cold temperatures
(below freezing) were predicted for Cape Canaveral, FL for the morning of the scheduled flight.
The engineers had no trouble reaching the decision to not launch in the event of cold weather
based on existing quality control criteria; they voiced loudly their concerns to MTI management

3

Mr. Boisjoly was not a Professional Engineer (P.E.) at the time of the ascent failure. After the disaster, Mr.
Boisjoly sensed his time at MTI was waning and he began the process to become a P.E. to provide for his family.
4
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is an independent agency of the U.S. in charge of the
civilian space program and aerospace research.
5
Morton Thiokol, Inc. was founded in 1929 by two chemists who invented synthetic rubber. In 1945, the Company
shifted to rocket propulsion technology. In 2007 it was acquired by ATK Launch Systems Group (ATK), a U.S.
company.
6
In layman’s terms, when looking at a space shuttle prior to launch, there is a large orange tank and two white
rockets on either side of the tank. Boisjoly was an expert in how the white rocket pieces fit together (Space Shuttle
Booster Joints).
7
A common inquiry is why the rocket was assembled in pieces and not one solid cylinder. The answer is that
Morton Thiokol, Inc. was based in Utah and the launch site is in Florida. The most economical way to manufacture
the rockets was in Utah. Then the pieces would be shipped by rail to the launch site and assembled.
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and NASA. Unfortunately, NASA did not share that view. The mission had been delayed six
times in the days leading up to the eventual launch. Over the course of several hours, NASA
pressured MTI executives to give the “go ahead” for launch. Mr. Boisjoly, in his Accounting
Horizons article (1993, 63), described the internal pressure that was placed on his engineering
team to alter their decision. In Mr. Boisjoly’s view, this pressure was an unacceptable override
of quality control standards that were in place to increase the probability of a safe launch. 8 Mr.
Boisjoly viewed the tactics used as abusive and violative of his personal integrity. After the
ascent failure of Challenger that killed six astronauts and a school teacher from New Hampshire,
Mr. Boisjoly voiced his concerns before the U.S. Congress in the formal investigations that
ensued. Mr. Boisjoly eventually left MTI, never to work in the aerospace industry again. Mr.
Boisjoly’s personal experience added to my interest about the Challenger disaster: what went
wrong, and why? The lessons of Challenger apply to accounting and business. Policies and
procedures exist to provide checks and balances that assure objectives are achieved. To begin, I
turn my focus to a brief discussion on the overarching aspects of this study.
1.2.

Overview
The purpose of this study is to examine voicing and how it is influenced by abusive

supervision and mentorship. In the preamble, Mr. Boisjoly described voicing in the face of
abusive supervision. Mr. Boisjoly was the living embodiment of how ignoring the “elephant in
the room” or violations of policies and procedures adversely affected the ability of NASA
officials to uphold quality standards. By ignoring the “elephant in the room” addressed by Mr.
Boisjoly, NASA officials caused the tragic deaths of the six-member Challenger crew and a
school teacher, Christa McAuliffe.

8

The technical details of the launch decision tree are noted in Boisjoly (1987).

4

The profession of public accounting has continuously emphasized the importance of
quality in the individual practitioner and in the firm’s practice. In 1979, the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), through its Auditing Standards Board, released the
first Statement on Quality Control Standards (SQCS). These standards provide a framework for
quality at the CPA firm level. The quality of the entire accounting profession depends upon the
collective performance of CPA firms, which is built upon the performance of the underlying
individual accountants. If an accountant acts in an inappropriate way, then the corresponding
CPA firm bears the effects. To the extent that such deeds are widespread, the whole profession
is placed at risk.9 This domino effect potentially discredits the entire profession, leading to a
crumbling of the underlying framework that built the profession. Quality control is vital for the
profession that serves the public interest.
Supervision is an essential feature in accounting quality and was one of the original nine
elements of SQCS No. 1 (AICPA, 1979, 3). Currently SQCS No. 8 (AICPA, 2012) identifies the
importance of effective supervision, which is emphasized in three of the six essential elements:
(1) engagement performance (§10.35.b), (2) monitoring (§10.60), and (3) human resources
(§10.31). Supervision as a quality mechanism in the accounting literature is largely unaddressed.
I focus on three key elements from SQCS No. 8 that provide a specific organizational context for
my study. The first element, engagement performance, describes the supervisor’s
responsibilities in maintaining legal, regulatory, and ethical requirements. A second element,
monitoring, addresses how a concern that is voiced should be dealt with internally by the firm.
The human resources element requires establishing competency, capability, and ethics among the

9

Largay (2002), then the editor of Accounting Horizons, a professor at Lehigh University, and an alumnus of Arthur
Andersen, described Arthur Andersen’s demise as a watershed event. He summarized the risk to the system that
Arthur Andersen caused and offered suggestions to fix it.

5

firm’s personnel. SQCS No. 8 notes that competency, capability, and ethics can be achieved
specifically through mentoring.
Voicing is an important factor used to maintain quality in the accounting profession, and
yet it has received limited attention in the accounting literature. Nelson, Proell, and Randel
(2016) presented voicing to the accounting literature. To date, research in accounting has been
narrowly focused around whistleblowing, which is a legal concept that involves a report of a
violation of a law or regulation to parties outside the entity (Moberly, 2006). An environment
that encourages voicing within the organization is a way to maintain quality in the firm because
potential violations of policies and procedures can be addressed by supervisors before they
evolve into legal problems. While voicing can help firms maintain quality, other actions may
suppress those intentions.
Abusive supervision exists in a variety of contexts and across organizations; the cost is an
estimated $23.8 billion annually in the U.S. (Tepper, Duffy, Henle, & Lambert, 2006).
Literature from management and psychology reveals high-pressure workplaces are at risk of
becoming abusive workplace environments (Russell, Ferris, & Sikora, 2016). The abusive
supervision construct was originally developed in the management literature. Abusive
supervision differs from other negative workplace behaviors (e.g., workplace bullying) because it
is hierarchical in nature (Tepper, 2000). Abusive supervision research is based solely upon the
subordinate’s perceptions. Studies have suggested investigating abusive supervision in contexts
beyond general business (Ashkanasy, Bennett, & Martinko, 2016; Mackey, Frieder, Brees, &
Martinko, 2015; Russell et al., 2016). Examining abusive supervision in the accounting
profession is a fruitful area for future exploration given the unique nature of public accounting
and its role in protecting the public interest. By conducting an exploratory study in the

6

professional accounting context, I inform the accounting, management, and psychology
literatures.
Mentoring research dates to Kram’s (1983) original work examining mentor/protégé
pairs. Dirsmith, Covaleski, and Samuel (2015) described how mentors help protégés in public
accounting to navigate firm politics. They chronicle how a mentor can help advance a protégé
within the firm, making the protégé more visible to superiors. Dalton, Davis, and Viator (2015),
found that having a mentor reduced the negative effects of unfavorable supervisory feedback in
public accounting firms. Considering the extant research on abusive supervision, voicing, and
mentoring, I arrived at the following research question: Does a mentoring relationship assist a
protégé to voice in an adverse situation with an abusive supervisor?
To study the effect of abusive supervision and mentoring on voicing behavior, I
developed three hypotheses. With literature from Tepper (2000) and Mackey et al. (2015), I
predicted that an abusive supervisor would decrease a protégé’s willingness to voice a violation
of policies and procedures. A second hypothesis based on Kram (1983) and Dalton et al. (2015)
predicted a mentoring relationship would increase voicing by a protégé when there is a violation
of policies and procedures. A third hypothesis tested the interaction between abusive supervision
and mentoring on voicing. To test my hypotheses, I developed a 2×2 quasi-experiment by
manipulating both an abusive supervisor (high/low) and a mentor relationship (high/low). The
dependent variable, voice, was a composite measure based on two responses measured on a
seven-point scale. The four treatment conditions were randomized in a vignette that placed the
participants in a firm where a colleague may have exposed client data. Participants consisted of
a convenience sample of graduate and undergraduate students who proxied for professional

7

accountants. Responses were captured through the online software Qualtrics® using both-in
person and remote data collection.
In this study, I integrate three streams of literature in the organizational context of public
accounting. The results of my study inform not only the accounting literature, but the
management literature, psychology literature, and accounting professionals. The existence of
high performance work systems, which exist in public accounting, are typically linked to positive
workplace outcomes (Pichler, Livingston, Ruggs, &Varma, 2016). However, those systems may
create a risk for abusive supervision and should be investigated (Pichler et al., 2016, 244).
Voicing allows for potential problems to be addressed to maintain quality not only for the
individual accountant, but the CPA firm, and the profession as a whole. The positive effects of
having a mentor have long been established (e.g., Allen, Eby, Poteet, Lentz, & Lima, 2004;
Dirsmith & Coveleski, 1985, Kram, 1983). Therefore, it is expected that a mentoring
relationship can reduce the negative effects of abusive supervision through voicing.
In Chapter 2, I present the necessary background information for the organizational
context of my study using relevant policies and procedures from the AICPA. I also discuss three
relevant literatures on supervision, voicing, and mentoring. In Chapter 3, I describe the
development of the hypotheses, research model, quasi-experiment, participants, and variables.
The analysis of each hypothesis is described in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5 I discuss the
findings, limitations, and research conclusions.

8

2.

Review of the Literature
The purpose of this chapter is to provoke interest in my study by summarizing and

synthesizing professional standards and relevant literatures. I begin by exploring the relevant
policies and procedures from the AICPA that provide the organizational context for my study. I
review and synthesize three individual streams of literature: (1) supervision, (2) voicing, and (3)
mentoring. Throughout this chapter I rely on Mr. Boisjoly’s narrative to weave my ideas
together. These three streams then lead to my hypotheses (Chapter 3).
2.1.

Organizational context
The accounting profession is dedicated to providing relevant and reliable financial

information to the public. It is that unique function that aligns accounting more closely to
professions such as medicine and engineering. For instance, medical professionals must protect,
restore, and promote the good health of their patients in the interest of public health. Similarly,
the engineering profession has a duty of trust, competence, safety, welfare, and quality assurance
that serves the public’s safety. All three of these professions issue licenses to individuals who
demonstrate competency and the requisite knowledge. Medical doctors must pass the United
States Medical Licensing Examination to become certified to practice medicine. Engineers must
pass a rigorous exam and meet state requirements in order to become a
Professional Engineer (PE). An accountant must meet statutory requirements and pass a multipart examination to become a Certified Public Accountant (CPA).
A CPA in public practice works for a CPA firm, which is comprised of one or more
CPAs depending on its size. Estimates place the total number of CPA firms in the U.S. around
85,000 (Accounting Today, 2016; Parker, 2012). CPA firms have some distinguishing facets
that should be carefully considered when generalizing to other disciplines. CPA firms vary

9

widely in size and scope, which can be broken down by size and professional service lines. The
most recognizable CPA firms are the Big 4: (1) Deloitte, (2) EY, (3) KPMG, and (4) PwC.10 The
Big 4 firms are the largest CPA firms in the U.S., have an international presence, and provide all
of the basic services of a CPA firm: (1) accounting and bookkeeping services, (2) auditing and
assurance services, (3) tax services, and (4) management consulting and risk advisory services.
National or regional firms are smaller than the Big 4, but compete for the same business and
provide the same basic services. These firms may also have an international presence. Finally,
the smallest CPA firms are categorized as local firms. It is rare, but not unheard of, for a local
firm to have an international presence. Typically, local firms consist of fewer than 25
professionals. Many local firms specialize in a particular service (e.g., tax services but not
consulting services). Regardless of the size and services provided, CPA firms generally maintain
a similar hierarchical personnel structure.
The organizational structure of a CPA firm consists of partners or shareholders at the
ownership level. CPA firms can be organized as a sole proprietorship, general partnership,
corporation, limited liability company, or limited liability partnership. The Big 4 firms and
many other CPA firms operate as a limited liability partnership because of its advantageous
liability protection: the individual partner is not liable for the acts of others not under the
partner’s control. Below the ownership level are managers, supervisors, seniors, and assistants,
respectively. Regardless of the hierarchical level of the accountant within the CPA firm, they
must be concerned with the quality of the service performed. The nature of a quality service is
carried throughout other professional levels like engineering and medicine. To address CPA

10

The Big 4 names listed refer to the brand and global organization of each firm.
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firm quality, the AICPA promulgated SQCS, now in its eighth iteration, discussed in the next
section.
2.1.1. Benchmarking CPA firm practice quality
For CPA firms, quality control is executing at a high standard a firm’s professional
responsibilities to its clients and the public (external decision makers). Sustaining quality control
begins with the organizational structure of the firm and flows down through the execution of its
policies and procedures. To maintain the quality control of the firm, the AICPA, through its
Auditing Standards Board, promulgated SQCS. The current version is SQCS No. 8 (AICPA,
2012, §10.17), which contains six elements that guide a CPA firm to establish effective policies
and procedures: (1) leadership, (2) acceptance and continuation of client relationships and
engagements, (3) ethical requirements, (4) engagement performance, (5) monitoring, and (6)
human resources.
[insert Table 1 here]
Leadership responsibilities within a CPA firm refer specifically to the “tone at the top.”
Through SCQS No. 8 the AICPA requires that the leadership assume responsibility for the firm.
Issues that arise regarding quality control are absolutely the responsibility of the leadership.
Beyond leadership, the CPA firm must also evaluate client relationships.
The acceptance and continuance of client relationships and engagements must be
addressed. For this, a CPA firm should establish policies and procedures that provide the firm
with reasonable assurance of (1) its competence to perform the engagement, (2) its compliance
with legal and ethical requirements, and (3) the client’s integrity. This standard applies to both
existing and new client engagements.

11

Policies and procedures in the quality control structure should also extend to the relevant
ethical requirements the CPA firm must bear. In particular, the CPA firm must provide
reasonable assurance its personnel comply with relevant ethical standards. The AICPA’s Code
of Professional Conduct establishes the requisite ethical standards a CPA must follow (AICPA,
2016).
Beyond the ethical requirements, a CPA firm must also be concerned with how well it is
performing during an engagement. The CPA firm must meet the firm, legal, and regulatory
standards established. In particular, the CPA firm must address (1) the consistency of quality,
(2) supervision responsibilities, and (3) review requirements. The review responsibilities require
that suitable personnel conduct the services the CPA firm provides. Additional, if a situation
being evaluated by the CPA firm is contentious, a consultation should take place. This meeting
should render a proper and just verdict and be documented.
To monitor a CPA firm, the firm itself should provide reasonable assurance that its
policies and procedures are (1) relevant, (2) adequate, and (3) operating effectively. The firm
must focus on service quality as the ultimate goal. To that end, if any complaints or allegations
are launched, the firm should provide clear channels of support for the voicer. Not only should
clear channels exist, but appropriate actions should take place to address the voicer’s concerns.
The human resources aspect refers to policies and procedures. Within this element, a
CPA firm must provide reasonable assurance that its personnel meet competency, capability, and
ethical requirements to perform the essential functions of a CPA firm’s practice. An accountant
placed into a role should be able to perform the duties assigned and develop the necessary
competencies to advance to the next hierarchical level.

12

CPA firms also must be enrolled in an AICPA practice-monitoring program in addition to
adhering to the six elements prescribed by SQCS No. 8. A practice-monitoring program is
referred to as peer review (currently required on a triennial basis), which is the evaluation of the
firm’s compliance with SQCS by a team of qualified peer reviewers (Reinstein & Apostolou,
2015). The CPA review firm gauges whether or not the CPA firm under review has developed
and implemented adequate policies and procedures. Consider the following: the quality of the
entire accounting profession is built upon the collective CPA firms, which are supported by the
underlying individual accountants. Therefore, if an individual accountant commits an act that is
unbecoming to the profession, then the CPA firm associated with the CPA also bears a cost, and
the profession itself suffers reputational effects. Thus, affirming that quality control measures
are met through peer review is essential.
For my study, I isolate three aspects from SQCS No. 8 (AICPA, 2012): (1) engagement
performance, (2) monitoring, and (3) human resources. Engagement performance describes the
supervisor’s responsibilities in maintaining legal, regulatory, and ethical requirements (AICPA,
2012, §10.35). I refer to this aspect as supervision. Next, the monitoring function addresses how
a concern that is voiced should be dealt with internally by the CPA firm (AICPA, 2012, §10.60).
I refer to this aspect as voicing, consistent with Boisjoly (1993). Finally, human resources
requires establishing competency, capability, and ethics among a firm’s personnel (AICPA,
2012, §10.31). One way to achieve this outcomes is through mentoring, which has a rich
presence in both the management and accounting literatures (AICPA, 2012 §10.A19). I refer to
the human resources aspect as mentoring.

13

2.2.

Supervision in public accounting
To provide a framework for quality in the accounting profession, the AICPA released

SQCS No. 8 in 2012. Supervision is an essential feature in accounting practice quality. I begin
this section with a discussion about the requirement and expectation for supervision through
three of the elements contained in SQCS No. 8. Additionally, I supplement the discussion of
supervision with “tone at the top.” After, I shift the discussion to abusive supervision, which is
integrated with Mr. Boisjoly’s experience. I then review and synthesize the relevant abusive
supervision literature summarized in Table 2.
[insert Table 2 here]
Supervision was one of the original nine elements of SQCS No. 1 (AICPA, 1979, 3) and
called for the establishment of policies and procedures, “…for the conduct and supervision of
work at all organizational levels … to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that the work
performed meets the firm’s standards of quality.” In the most current iteration, SQCS No. 8
(AICPA, 2012) highlights the importance of effective, indeed quality, supervision, which is
emphasized in three of the six essential elements: (1) relevant ethical requirements (§10.21), (2)
human resources (§10.31), and (3) engagement performance (§10.35.b).
A firm should provide reasonable assurance that its personnel abide by the ethical
requirements. In human resources, sufficient levels of personnel must be maintained to perform
engagements to meet professional standards, legal requirements, and regulatory requirements.
Finally engagement performance must allow for policies and procedures that outline the
supervisor’s responsibilities during an engagement.

14

2.2.1. Abusive supervision literature
Literature exists that reveals a sustained high performance workplace is at risk of
fostering abusive supervisors. To illustrate how a high-performance workplace may evolve into
an abusive situation, I refer to the Challenger ascent failure. After several delays to the launch of
mission STS-51-L, the launch was again threatened due to unseasonably cold weather moving
through south Florida. Even with the cold, the engineers at MTI were pressured by management
to approve the launch. Overriding the engineers’ decision resulted in the deaths of six astronauts
and a teacher. After the ascent failure, Mr. Boisjoly was assigned to the “failure investigation
team” (Boisjoly, 1993, 65). He chose to voice information (his truth), which was contrary to the
views stated by a general manager of MTI during a public hearing. After, Mr. Boisjoly was
removed from the failure investigation team, ostracized, and isolated within his own
organization— simply for telling the truth.
Abusive supervision exists in a variety of contexts and across organizations with a
significant negative financial impact. 11 The construct was originally developed in the
management literature (Tepper, 2000). Since that time, studies have attempted to distinguish
abusive supervision from related constructs (e.g., petty tyranny, workplace bullying). Tepper
(2000, 178) defined abusive supervision as “[s]ubordinates’ perceptions of the extent to which
their supervisors engage in the sustained display of hostile verbal and non-verbal behaviors,
excluding physical contact.” This construct suggests that the perceptions of the subordinate
evolve through continued interactions with the supervisor (Chan & McAllister, 2014; Klaussner,
2014). Manifestations of abusive supervision may include: (1) coercion, (2) inconsiderate
actions, (3) loud and angry tantrums, (4) public criticism, and (5) rudeness. Research has

11

Abusive supervision is a perception and may not constitute actual abuse. Likewise, a subordinate may perceive
abusive supervision while the supervisor does not perceive actions to be abusive.
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considered abusive supervision in justice theory, which is used as the primary explanatory
framework (Mackey et al., 2015).12,13 The perceptions of abusive supervision likely stem from a
subordinate’s inferences about fairness of supervisory justice (Klaussner, 2014). In sum, abusive
supervision is based upon the supervised individual’s perceptions, which may or may not be real.
Namie and Namie (2000) estimate that between 10% and 16% of employees experience abusive
supervision. Sheehan, McCarthy, Barker, and Henderson (2001) estimate the cost to the
organization of abusive supervision (e.g., absenteeism, legal costs, organizational turnover,
reduced productivity) is between $17,000 and $24,000 per serious incident. These estimates led
Tepper et al. (2006, 119) to place the annual cost of abusive supervision in the U.S. at a
conservative total of $23.8 billion per year.
Tepper (2000), in the initial abusive supervision study, defined the construct and
developed a 15-item measure of abusive supervision, which was adapted from other nonphysical
abuse scales in different types of relationships (e.g., psychological abuse in dating relationships).
The measure was validated with the use of MBA students (T1: n=712, 53.0% response rate and
T2: n=362; 50.8% response rate); a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted with working
individuals recruited through random digit dialing over two periods. The results from Tepper’s
(2000) study revealed that abusive supervision led to several dysfunctional consequences: (1)
higher turnover, (2) less favorable attitudes towards job, life, and organization, (3) greater work
and family life conflict, and (4) intense psychological distress. When subordinates had less job
mobility, the effects of abusive supervision were more pronounced for (1) job satisfaction, (2)

12

Justice theory is derived from fairness and equity theory (Adams, 1963; Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), which has
overlaps with social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).
13
Tepper (2000) developed the abusive supervision construct using Bies and Moag’s (1986) interactional justice
theory, which was developed anecdotally after Ph.D. students perceived unfair and varying treatment by faculty
members.
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family-to-work conflict, (3) depression, and (4) emotional exhaustion. Subsequent studies found
similar results (e.g., Breaux, Perrewé, Hall, Frink, & Hochwarter, 2008; Burton & Hoobler,
2011; Carlson, Ferguson, Perrewé, & Whitten, 2011).
In a review of extant literature, Tepper (2007) examined and defined the eight different
constructs used in nonphysical supervisory hostility: (1) abusive supervision, (2) generalized
hierarchical abuse, (3) petty tyranny, (4) victimization, (5) workplace bullying, (6) supervisor
aggression, (7) supervisor undermining, and (8) negative mentoring experiences. All of these
constructs can encompass, or have the potential to encompass, a component of downward
hostility (summarized in Table 3). Research also investigated the antecedents and outcomes of
abusive supervision. Most studies examined outcome variables, some of which included work
attitudes, psychological distress, work-family conflict, job satisfaction, deviance, emotional
exhaustion, and problem-drinking. Finally, Tepper (2007) introduced a refined “emergent”
model of abusive supervision complete with mediators, moderators, antecedents, and outcomes.
Tepper’s (2007) chief critique of ongoing abusive supervision research focused on the lack of
theoretical application to the construct.
[insert Table 3 here]
Mawritz, Mayer, Hoobler, Wayne, and Marinova (2012) studied the progression of
abusive supervision from executives to management to employees (n=383 pairs, 75.2% response
rate). They found abusive manager behavior is positively associated with abusive supervisor
behavior, which is positively associated with work group interpersonal deviance (i.e., abusive
behaviors directed at other organizational members). Additionally, the effects of abusive
supervision are exacerbated in an environment that exhibits signs of a hostile work environment.
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In this context, a hostile work environment was defined as “consistent acrimonious, antagonistic,
and suspicious feelings within the workgroup” (Mawritz et al., 2012, 327).
Martinko, Harvey, Brees, and Mackey (2013) reviewed the literature regarding abusive
supervision in two time periods (2000-2007 and 2008-2012). In the first time period, the authors
summarized research preceding Tepper’s (2007) review, followed by the research from 20082012. Martinko et al. (2013) related the second wave of studies to Tepper’s (2007) future
research suggestions. The antecedents, outcomes, and moderators of abusive supervision are
described along with a more comprehensive abusive supervision model in comparison to the
Tepper (2007) model. The authors discussed five supervisor-level antecedents of abusive
supervision: (1) stress, (2) conflict levels, (3) deep-level dissimilarity, (4) emotional intelligence,
and (5) histories of family undermining (Martinko et al., 2013, p. S126). Four outcome variables
include (1) aggression/deviance, (2) psychological distress, (3) family well-being, and (4)
resistance. Four moderating variables include (1) physical exercise, (2) organizational-based
self-efficacy, (3) performance evaluations, and (4) low-quality leader-member exchange
relationships. The outcomes of abusive supervision described by Martinko et al. (2013) are
presented in Table 3.
Mackey et al. (2016) conducted a meta-analysis (k=140) to determine population
estimates for abusive supervision and various demographic, antecedent, and outcome variables
previously examined since the construction of Tepper’s (2000) measure. Various adaptations of
the instrument allows for the possibility of measurement artifacts (Humphrey, 2011). The results
of Mackey et al.’s (2016) meta-analysis suggested that practitioners should be concerned about
employees’ perceptions of abusive supervision. The results pointed toward a wide range of
employees who report perceptions of abusive supervision. Additional results indicated that
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perceptions of abusive supervision are negatively associated with perceptions of justice in the
workplace. Finally, Mackey et al. (2016) showed an association of the perceptions of both
abusive supervision and negative leadership (e.g., ethical leadership). A wide variety of
organizational and personal outcomes (e.g., organizational citizenship behavior) are associated
with the perceptions of abusive supervision. Mackey et al. (2016) recommend researchers
applying justice theory in abusive supervision research recognize the central role that perceptions
play in the abusive supervision construct. With the breadth of research on abusive supervision
since Tepper’s (2000) seminal study, Mackey et al. (2016) suggested future researchers test the
boundaries of the effects of perceptions of abusive supervision. Recent legislative actions have
been introduced to address abusive workplace behaviors (Mackey et al. 2016).14 A key aspect to
this study is investigating how abusive supervision influences subordinates reactions when a
discordant situation arises; notably whether the individual will voice to a more senior member of
the firm.
2.3.

Voicing
Voicing has a rich history in both the management and psychology literatures. Only

recently has the topic of voicing been studied in accounting (Nelson et al., 2016). In this section,
I begin by distinguishing between voicing and whistleblowing. I then illustrate the bright line
distinction through Mr. Boisjoly’s experience followed by a synthesis of the relevant literature
from both management and accounting, which is summarized in Table 4.
[insert Table 4 here]
While all whistleblowing is voicing, all voicing is not whistleblowing. Consider the
classic definition of whistleblowing from Near and Miceli (1985, 4):

14

As of April 2017, 32 legislatures have introduced a healthy workplace bill (Healthy Workplace Bill, 2017).
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We, therefore, define whistle-blowing to be the disclosure by organization
members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the
control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect
action.
Now examine the definition of voicing (Bashshur & Oc, 2015, 1531):
…we define voice as the discretionary or formal expression of ideas, opinions,
suggestions, or alternative approaches directed to a specific target inside or
outside of the organization with the intent to change an objectionable state of
affairs and to improve the current functioning of the organization, group, or
individual.
Also consider the definition recently used in an accounting study by Nelson et al. (2016, 1784),
which is from Burris, Detert, and Chiaburu (2008, 22):
Voice is defined as the verbal communication of problems or ideas intended to
stimulate organizational improvement to superiors with the perceived power to
take action.
A strict interpretation of whistleblowing fails to account for the disclosing of a policy and
procedure violation. A violation of policies and procedures is not necessarily (1) illegal, (2)
immoral, or (3) illegitimate. However, an employee may perceive that type of violation as
something worth reporting upward in the firm’s hierarchy. From a manager’s perspective, it may
be a perfectly permissible exception. However, too many management exceptions create a
slippery slope to (1) illegal, (2) immoral, or (3) illegitimate behavior. Regardless of whether or
not the behavior meets these thresholds, disclosing, for instance, a policy or procedure violation
is voicing (i.e., not whistleblowing). However, from a strict standpoint, the case may require an
ethical judgment.15

Derived from Rest’s (1986) model on the ethical reasoning process, an ethical action is the follow through of an
intent to act that was caused by an ethical evaluation after an ethical dilemma was recognized. My research is not
concerned with judging the complexity of ethical issues associated with voicing a concern, although those are
certainly important. Rather, I focus on the practical application of voicing a concern to a perceived violation of
policies and procedures.
15
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In the case of Mr. Boisjoly, the engineers on the launch team concluded the proposed
launch date would pose too great a risk because of the cold forecasted temperatures. Mr.
Boisjoly and a fellow engineer pressed hard to delay the launch at STS-51-L. The decision to
launch Challenger on January 28, 1986 occurred after NASA and managers at MTI overrode the
engineers. While Mr. Boisjoly voiced his concern to management, the behavior of management
was not (1) illegal, (2) immoral, or (3) illegitimate, and no criminal charges ever arose from the
decision to launch Challenger. However, after the disaster, Mr. Boisjoly was publicly referred to
as a whistleblower and blacklisted from his profession simply for following procedure and
expressing his professional assessment to management. Mr. Boisjoly made the decision to voice
his concerns to address the critical errors and the override of policies and procedures led to the
decision to launch Challenger.
The fundamental issue with voicing a concern that leads to marginalization is that,
primitively, there is a greater risk of death (Joubert, 2006; Power & Compion, 2009). In the
academic literature, this concept is known as “retaliation risk” or “…undesirable action taken
against a whistleblower16—in direct response to the whistleblowing—who reported wrongdoing
internally or externally, outside of the organization” (Rehg, Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2008,
222). Previous studies explored the mechanisms to arrive at an ethical judgment (e.g., Rest,
1986; Mintz, 2016), and examined the reporting channels (e.g., other superiors, hotlines, external
enforcement agents, and audit committees) available to those who elected to voice a concern
(Kaplan, Pope, & Samuels, 2010). Legal definitions of whistleblowing refer to a formal external
reporting function in which the information is disclosed to someone outside of the organization
(Moberly, 2006). However, these definitions are beyond the scope of voicing a concern of a
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All whistleblowing is voicing, but not all voicing is whistleblowing.
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violation of policies and procedures within the organization and in the bounds of positional
authority.
Mr. Boisjoly, in his 1993 Accounting Horizons article, described the three options
available to an individual who has observed or perceived a violation of policies and procedures:
(1) exit, (2) voice, or (3) remain loyal [to the firm].17 Exiting is the choice made to extract
oneself from an ethical confrontation by leaving the company or transferring to another
department within the same company to avoid having to make a proper ethical decision
(Boisjoly, 1993, 59). Voice is the option chosen by those who are willing to stand up for ethical
principles in the belief that change will result (Boisjoly, 1993, 59). Remaining loyal is serving
self-interests of career and organization with minimal objective reasoning of the consequences to
others or the company (Boisjoly, 1993, 59). In the preface to Mr. Boisjoly’s article, managing
editor Jerry Arnold (1993)18 described why an engineer’s story belongs in Accounting Horizons,
and as difficult as it may be, voicing a violation is the only accepTable answer.19
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) (MM&V) also outlined the three options Mr.
Boisjoly presented as the only options present when facing an unsatisfactory situation. In their
study, MM&V conducted a meta-analysis (k=26) of the whistleblowing literature.20 MM&V
presented an analysis of the correlates and characteristics of both whistleblowing and retaliation.
They also distinguished between intent and actual whistleblowing. To that time, there were only
two studies that examined actual whistleblowing, which did not correlate strongly with intent [to

Mr. Boisjoly bases his options on Hirschman’s (1970) book Exit, Voice & Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States.
18
Jerry Arnold, Ph.D. is professor emeritus at the University of Southern California; he was the managing editor of
Accounting Horizons from 1992-1994.
19
Neither Boisjoly (1993) nor Arnold (1993) make reference to whistleblowing. I agree with this choice because
whistleblowing was originally developed as a legal term (Nader, Petkas, & Blackwell, 1972) before evolving to its
present-day broad use.
20
Relevant accounting research was excluded from the study, without explanation.
17
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blow the whistle]. However, MM&V described the difficulties in conducting research with
actual whistleblowers, which include (1) self-reporting, (2) access to longitudinal data, and (3)
hindsight bias (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, 292). The authors concluded that there
was currently not enough data to show a meaningful correlation between intent and actual
whistleblowing, validating continued research on the subject. From the retaliation perspective,
MM&V showed that perceived supervisor support is negatively correlated with retaliation, which
is the strongest finding in the retaliation portion of the meta-analysis. This finding highlighted
the negative consequences a subordinate may face from an abusive supervisor to a voicing
decision.
Since the MM&V meta-analysis, several studies have made contributions to the literature
in general and from an accounting perspective. Rehg et al. (2008) surveyed 3,288 Air Force
employees, 1,224 of whom perceived wrongdoing. Among those who witnessed wrongdoing,
women reported a higher perception of retaliation. Additionally, (1) lack of support from others
and (2) low power were related to retaliation perception.
Kaplan et al. (2010) examined the extent to which an unsuccessful social confrontation
with a supervisor influences a subordinate’s reporting intentions to a supervisor’s supervisor and
an internal auditor. The authors employed a 2 × 2 between subjects design (fraud × social
confrontation); misappropriation of assets/financial statement fraud × meeting (or not) with the
transgressor. Participants were MBA students (n=77). The findings suggested that subordinates
who experienced unsuccessful social confrontation with a supervisor were more likely to seek
out the supervisor’s supervisor rather than an internal auditor. The authors suspected this
decision was related to the relative power of the recipient of the report (Kaplan et al., 2010, 63).
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Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, and Thornton (2010) examined whether whistleblowing
increased when organizational whistleblowing procedures, outcomes, and related exchanges with
superiors were perceived as fair. The authors used a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial between-subjects design
(procedures × interactions with management × outcomes) with internal and managerial
accountants (n=447). The findings indicated that whistleblowing policies and mechanisms
incorporating higher levels of procedural, distributive, and interactional justice were perceived to
increase the likelihood that an accountant would internally report a financial statement fraud.
Reporting intentions within accounting firms was more recently studied by Taylor and
Curtis (2013). The authors examined third year audit seniors’ likelihood of whistleblowing in a
2 × 2 experiment (organizational response × power distance). They found the likelihood of
voicing was greater if the wrongdoer was a peer than if a superior. Additionally, a prior positive
organizational response positively affected subsequent voicing likelihood.
Gao, Greenberg, and Wong-On-Wing (2015) examined whistleblowing intentions from
the perspective of lower-level employees and reporting channels (n=273). In a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 fully
crossed experimental design (reporting channel × bystander × power status × case), the authors
found that external reporting channels increased the intentions to whistleblow. This finding was
in contrast to Kaplan, Pany, Samuels, and Zhang’s (2009) study. Kaplan’s (2015) commentary
called for additional research evaluating the dynamics of multiple employees observing or
becoming aware of wrongdoing, and their subsequent reporting intentions.
Nelson et al. (2016) examined willingness to voice in an auditing setting using a sample
of auditors from two large firms. They conducted five experiments varying within and betweensubject designs to explore how a team oriented leader affects an auditor’s willingness to speak
up. Willingness to voice was higher when the leader was team-oriented and when the issues
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were aligned with the leader’s concerns. The fear of consequences to voicing did not affect
participants’ willingness to do so.
As stated previously, Mr. Boisjoly (1993) classified the options a potential voicer must
choose from as (1) exit, (2) voice, or (3) remain loyal [to the firm]. He viewed these as the only
three reasonable options available.21 For purposes of my study, voicing refers to reporting a
perceived violation of quality control policies and procedures to those in a position to effect
change. Other studies examining retaliation often explored how the employee may “get even”
for some perceived injustice (Siegel Christian, Christian, Garza, & Ellis, 2012; Martinko et al.,
2013). These examinations only partially examined the way a firm may influence the voice of a
subordinate. In Mr. Boisjoly’s case, he was the sacrificial lamb to sustain a viable firm (MTI).
Unfortunately, he lost his career as an engineer, relegated to consulting for the remainder of his
life and sharing his painful remembrances.22,23,24
I distinguish between whistleblowing and voicing. A violation does not need to be a
violation of laws or statues that would constitute whistleblowing. As in Mr. Boisjoly’s
experience, the violation was management’s override of the “MTI Assessment of Temperature
Concern on SRM-25 Launch” (Arnold, 1993). To achieve that distinction, I began with a
discussion of whistleblowing and voicing to clarify differences between the two separate
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Voicing is a more refined definition of speaking up than whistleblowing, which is a term that refers to the legal
aspects of choosing to report a situation that violates a law.
22
Mr. Robert Boisjoly died at age 73 from cancer of the colon, kidneys, and liver. Prior to his passing, Boisjoly was
awarded the Prize for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility by the American Association for the Advancement of
Science. He became outspoken on corporate governance topics and presented corporate ethics topics to more than
300 universities and civic groups (Martin & Yee, 2012).
23
An investigation by the Rogers Commission resulted in nine recommendations for improving the safety of the
shuttle program. MTI ceded a $10 million incentive fee without accepting liability for the accident (Jensen, 1996,
355).
24
Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc – “After this therefore because of this,” is a logical fallacy. It means, “one thing
follows the other therefore it was caused by the other. But it’s not always true. In fact it’s hardly ever true.” The
thought of top-down ethics may not go far enough. While COSO speaks to corporate culture being top down, there
may be a need for a “tone” at the middle, the side, or even the bottom.
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constructs. I summarize voicing (1) from Mr. Boisjoly’s perspective and (2) the relevant
literature. Finally, I conclud with the importance of voicing and how it applies in an accounting
context.
2.4.

Mentoring theory
Mentoring has a rich history in the accounting, management, and psychology literatures.

I begin with a broad discussion on the topic before honing in on mentoring in an accounting
context. Continuing with the theme, I conclude with Mr. Boisjoly’s (1993) suggestions from his
Accounting Horizons article. Table 5 summarizes the relevant mentoring literature.
[insert Table 5 here]
Contemporary mentoring research began with the pioneering work of Kram (1983, 1988).
However, the word “mentor” itself is rooted in Greek mythology.25 Kram (1983) developed a
conceptual model of mentoring in a corporate setting based on the behavior and perceptions of
18 mentor-protégé pairs. She described how a mentor can buffer the negative effects that may be
felt by the protégé in an adverse situation (Kram, 1988, 27). A mentoring relationship may be
initiated formally or informally, but the mutually reciprocal nature of mentoring (i.e., both the
mentor and protégé derive benefits) suggests that the relationship ensues because both the
mentor and the protégé perceive the benefits to outweigh the costs and, therefore, willingly
participate (Allen, 2007; Dougherty, Turban, & Haggard, 2010; Harvey, McIntyre, Heames, &
Moeller, 2009; Kaplan, Keinath, & Walo, 2001; Kram, 1988; Olian, Carroll, & Giannantonio,
1993).26 A formal mentoring relationship is either (1) where the mentor and protégé are assigned
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Mentor was a long-time friend of Odysseus. When Odysseus left for the Trojan War, Athena disguises herself as
Mentor in charge of his son’s well-being. As Mentor, she offered encouragement to Telemachus, Odysseus’ son.
Thus the term “mentor” has evolved to refer to a role model who offers guiding wisdom and commitment to the
development of the protégé’s career.
26
The mentor/protégé relationship has costs. Those costs may be higher when the mentoring relationship is
mismatched. Costs include distractions from professional responsibilities, inconsistent guidance across mentors,
poor advice, and interpersonal disagreements (Kram, 1988, 159-167).
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by the firm to one another or (2) where the mentor is the protégé’s supervisor in the firm’s
hierarchy.
A successful mentor-protégé relationship values not only the mentor and protégé,
but the organization as well (Allen & Eby, 2010; Ragins & Kram, 2007). In a metaanalysis on the outcomes of mentoring, Allen et al. (2004) found that the mentor-protégé
relationship improves career satisfaction, effectiveness, and job advancement
opportunities for the protégés. Mutually beneficial, the mentors gain satisfaction from a
protégé’s progress, and often find that their own career path is bolstered by participating
in the protégé’s success. Dirsmith et al. (2015, 178) described how a successful protégé
bolsters the career of the mentor. The organization also benefits from the mentor/protégé
relationship as contemplated by SQCS No. 8 (AICPA, 2012). A positive mentor/protégé
relationship exhibits (1) decreased turnover, (2) enhanced job performance (Ragins &
Kram, 2007), and (3) increased firm loyalty (Hall & Smith, 2009), which benefit the firm.
2.4.1. Mentoring research in an accounting context
Mentoring research suggests that to best understand mentoring relationships they should
be studied in specific organizational contexts under differing conditions (e.g., Allen, Poteet, &
Burroughs, 1997; Kram, 1988; Kram & Ragins, 2007).27 Barker, Monks, and Buckley (1999),
studied chartered accountants from two Big 5 accounting firms in Ireland (n=287; 51% response
rate) and found the protégé's perceived informal mentoring to be well-established and important
to the career progress of public accountants. The career development aspect was found to be the
strongest aspect of the mentoring relationship. Kaplan et al. (2001) conducted a survey of
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Viator and Pasewark (2005, 373) describe the two ways in which a public accounting firm context differs a
typical business: (1) accounting firms are generally organized into service area with specialized training for
professionals in those areas (e.g., auditing, tax, consulting services), and (2) public accountants typically gain
expertise in a specific industry to achieve a comparative advantage in the marketplace and better serve their clients.

27

auditor protégés (n=242; 12% response rate) and found that, in general, protégés perceived
barriers to the mentor/protégé relationship to be low; obstructions to the relationship included
firm size, gender, perceived willingness of the mentor, and access to a mentor.28 Viator (1999)
studied CPAs in large accounting firms (n=723, 24.2% response rate), and found that when
neither the mentor nor protégé had input of determining the relationship pairing, satisfaction for
the protégé was lower. Thus informal mentoring relationships were perceived as more beneficial
to both the individual and the firm.
Herbohn (2004) studied mentoring among Australian accountants (n=161; 40% response
rate) and found (1) greater perceived barriers to the mentor/protégé relationship for local firm
accountants, and (2) protégés receiving higher levels of support had lower organizational
turnover intentions. Siegel, Reinstein, and Miller (2001) surveyed audit professionals (n=118;
59% response rate) in public accounting firms and concluded that perceptions of fairness within
the firm increased when respondents had a mentor. Finally, Dalton et al. (2015) surveyed public
accountants (n=421; 65.6% at the senior level) and found that the presence of an informal
mentor29 tempers the negative impact of unfavorable supervisory feedback environments (i.e., an
abusive supervisor).
Mr. Boisjoly (1993) offered advice to accountants in their professional work. One of the
key principles Mr. Boisjoly argued for was a “top/down support and information flow.” He also
argued for firms to employ an ombudsman for instances in which typical reporting channels are
ineffective. My interpretation of Mr. Boisjoly’s argument is that a mentor may help support the
voicing efforts of a protégé. In their commentary on qualitative research methods in accounting,
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The findings specifically are that local firm auditors perceived more barriers than large firm auditors, and women
perceived fewer barriers than men.
29
An informal mentor is one outside of the supervisor-subordinate relationship.
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Dirsmith et al. (2015) described how mentors assists protégés in public accounting navigate firm
politics. They discussed how a mentor helps advance a protégé within the firm, making him/her
more visible to superiors responsible for promotion. Additionally, a mentor becomes someone
who can “go to bat” for the protégé. When considered with the findings of Dalton et al. (2015),
an interesting intersection can be explored. I extend mentoring theory within the accounting
context by considering how CPA firm quality is improved by the presence of a mentoring
relationship in an adverse situation. This extension is important because the accounting
profession emphasizes quality within the firm as including mentoring (e.g., AICPA, 2012). The
rich body of literature from across disciplines that supports mentoring in professional settings
creates a framework that I use to investigate how mentoring affects voicing in an accounting
specific context.

29

3.

Research method
In this chapter I first present the research question followed by three hypotheses. Next, I

discuss the research design and research participants. I present my variable definitions and
manipulation checks and my analysis method, including the research model and planned
statistical tests.30
3.1.

Research question
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, I examine how a professional’s decision to

voice is affected by the perception of having an abusive supervisor. Second, I examine how a
professional’s decision to voice is affected by the presence of a mentoring relationship.
Combined, I offer the following research question:
RQ: Does a mentoring relationship assist a protégé to voice in an adverse situation with
an abusive supervisor?
3.2.

Hypotheses
Abusive supervision was developed in the management literature as hierarchical

workplace bullying. That is, the supervisor is perceived by the subordinate to be abusive by
virtue of a sustained display of verbal and non-verbal behaviors (Tepper, 2000). Abusive
supervision does not include physical contact. Mackey et al. (2016) suggest future research on
abusive supervision should consider different contexts where the phenomenon occurs. In the
accounting literature, Kaplan et al. (2010) examined subordinates’ reactions to an unfavorable
confrontation, but this falls short of being considered abusive supervision. Dalton et al. (2015)
encourage research about abusive supervision specifically within an accounting context. Thus,

The study reported in this dissertation received prior approval from West Virginia University’s Institutional
Review Board (Protocol #1701406867).
30

30

an accounting context is an appropriate one for an exploration of the abusive supervision
construct.
Following proper policies and procedures is an effective way to maintain firm quality.
The AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct describes the Principles and Rules all AICPA
members must abide by to meet the minimum standards of the profession. Additionally,
Statement on Quality Control Standards (SQCS) No. 8 (AICPA, 2012) contains three elements
directly affecting supervision in accounting, (1) relevant ethical requirements, (2) human
resources and (3) engagement performance. The elements layout the necessary requirements for
policies and procedures to achieve adequate supervision in public accounting.
If an infraction violating policies and procedures is perceived, voicing the possibility is a
way of maintaining quality in any firm. Prior research has shown that organizational
commitment is lower for those who perceive abusive supervision (Mackey et al., 2016).
Meanwhile, when organizational commitment is low, intent to whistleblow also is lower
(Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Nelson et al. (2016) introduce voicing in the
accounting literature as a way to stimulate organizational improvement. By focusing on voicing
(instead of whistleblowing) I can hone in on violations of policies and procedures that may not
yet be illegitimate, illegal, or immoral. This distinction allows for voicing to detect and correct a
perceived violation before it results in illegal, immoral, or illegitimate activity. My research in
the professional context is exploratory; findings in the management literature may not be
generalizable to an accounting setting (Liang, Farh, & Farh, 2012; Nelson et al., 2016).
However, research has shown that professional settings can proxy for accounting settings
(Kaplan et al. 2010). I propose the following hypothesis:
H1: Abusive supervision decreases the likelihood a protégé will voice a violation of firm
policies and procedures.
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Mentoring has been the focus of both practitioners and academicians. Mentors and
protégés both can benefit from the pairing from career and psychosocial functions. Informal
mentors who are external to the supervisor-subordinate relationship can provide greater benefits
to both the mentor and protégé. In the psychology literature, Allen et al. (2004) find that having
a mentor is associated with greater career outcomes. Higher affective commitment is positively
associated a protégé being mentored (Payne & Huffman, 2005). SQCS No. 8 (AICPA, 2012)
includes mentoring as a key feature to maintain the quality of the firm. In an initial study of
mentoring pairs in accounting, Dirsmith and Covaleski (1985) discuss how non-formal
communications influence a firm’s control systems. With that, I offer my second hypothesis:
H2: The existence of a mentoring relationship increases the likelihood a protégé will
voice a violation of firm policies and procedures.
Dalton et al. (2015) found that mentors reduce the negative effects of unfavorable
supervisory feedback. Additionally, Dalton et al. (2015) call for future research to examine the
buffering effects of negative workplace outcomes including abusive supervision. Therefore, I
combine my first two hypotheses to create a third, the moderating effect of a mentoring
relationship in the presence of perceived abusive supervision:
H3: The association between voicing and abusive supervision is moderated by the
presence of a mentoring relationship, such that the presence of a mentoring
relationship increases the likelihood of voicing a violation of firm policies and
procedures.
[insert Table 6 here]
3.3.

Research design
This study is an initial examination of abusive supervision, voicing, and mentoring in a

professional context. Prior research investigating mentors and abusive supervision in accounting
used survey based approaches (e.g., Dalton et al., 2015). To capture the specific constructs and

32

their causal inferences, I isolate abusive supervision, voicing, and mentoring using an
experimental methodology, which is appropriate to maintain internal validity regarding the
assertions about the dependent and independent variables (Pedhauzer & Schmelkin, 1991).
For this study, a vignette was developed where there is an abusive supervisor and a
mentoring relationship. A survey was given to a class of 20 graduate-level accounting students
with previous internship experience to help establish external validity. Of the 17 students who
completed the survey, 11 had a past mentor and internship experience in an accounting setting.
The students provided information regarding past voicing instances and mentoring experiences.
The students responded to an open-ended prompt asking what a mentor was to them. The
answers indicated their perception of a mentor was someone who offers guidance and assistance
during difficult situations. The words “guidance,” “assist,” and “answers concerns” were used
by 14 students. I also relied on past studies that employed an experimental methodology in the
abusive supervision and mentoring literatures. Olian, Carrol, Giannantonio, and Feren (1988)
manipulated the mentor’s interpersonal competence in their vignette. I used the description of
their experimental materials as a basis along with the material gathered from the graduate-level
accounting students for the mentor manipulation. Burton and Hoobler (2006) manipulated
abusive supervision in their vignette. Their experimental materials included an abusive
supervisor in a low-level workplace setting. For this quasi-experiment, I adapted the setting to a
professional entry-level position.
The abusive supervisor and mentoring relationship each had two conditions (high and
low) resulting in a 2 × 2 fully crossed between-subjects design. The survey was administered
online and in the classroom to graduate and undergraduate students (described in section 3.5)
who were randomly assigned to one of the four possible conditions (refer to Table 7 and
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Appendix C). However, the possibility of confounding variables exists because the surveysetting lacks strict control. The possibility of confounding variables excludes the ability to make
causal arguments. Thus, I refer to this study as a quasi-experiment.31
[insert Table 7 here]
My study is an initial examination of perceptions of abusive supervision in a professional
context. Most prior research in abusive supervision and mentoring is survey-based (e.g., Dalton
et al., 2016; Taylor & Curtis, 2016; Viator, 1999). Survey-based approaches suffer from a lack
of manipulated variables in a controlled setting, which makes causal attribution unattainable
(Bloomfield et al., 2016, 378). This quasi-experimental approach is appropriate given the
exploratory nature of the research and is commonly employed in the social sciences.32 Having
participants assess the likelihood of voicing individually, rather than collectively, allows the
focus to be on the individual participant’s perceptions of abusive supervision. Likewise, this
context allows for the individual to interpret the effect that a mentoring relationship would have
on the likelihood of voicing.
3.4.

Research model
The research model is described above and pictured in Figure 1. It included one

dependent variable. Two independent variables and three conditioning variables are included.
All three types of variables are discussed in the subsequent sections.
[insert Figure 1 here]
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More specifically, Aguinis and Bradley (2014) describe this type of methodology as an experimental vignette
methodology that is used to balance internal and external validity. However, the conclusions may be ambiguous
regarding causal relationships (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014, 351).
32
Allen, Eby, O’Brien, and Lentz (2008, 348) reviewed 201 mentoring papers, which included 178 empirical
articles. Only 5.1% used an experimental approach, which led Allen et al. (2008) to encourage additional research
using an experimental methodology. Scandura and Pelligrini (2010, 84) comment that “experimental laboratory
research involving both random assignment and high experimental control could contribute greatly to our
understanding of mentoring.”
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3.4.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable is voicing. There are typically two feasible options available to
researchers to assess voicing: (1) a survey-based approach asking participants about past
experiences in voicing, or (2) a quasi-experimental approach asking participants about their
willingness to voice. After reading the vignette, the participants respond to two randomized
statements to operationalize the voicing construct: (1) “You are willing to speak up about your
supervisor’s actions to their superior,” and (2) “You are comfortable speaking up about your
supervisor’s actions to their superior.” Participants indicate their willingness to voice [speak up]
using a 7-point scale anchored at “Strongly Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.”
3.4.2. Independent variables
The independent variables in this model were abusive supervision and a mentoring
relationship. Abusive supervision is expected to have a negative effect on the dependent variable
voicing. A mentoring relationship is expected to have a positive effect on the dependent variable
voicing. Each of these independent variables were operationalized in a quasi-experimental
setting. The next section (Section 3.4.2.1.) discusses the abusive supervision conditions used in
the vignette in greater detail. Following that, the subsequent section (Section 3.4.2.2.) discusses
the mentoring relationship conditions used in the vignette. The complete instrument with all four
vignettes is included in Appendix C.
3.4.2.1. Abusive supervision
This study contained two conditions for abusive supervision: (1) high and (2) low. In the
high abusive supervisor condition, the supervisor exhibited abusive behaviors as defined by
Tepper (2000). The abusive supervision characteristics were adapted from Burton and Hoobler
(2006) for the vignette. The following was used in the high abusive supervision condition:
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Your supervisor has a reputation of frequently making negative comments to the
team. During your conversation about the possible exposure, with the door to the
office open your supervisor becomes visibly upset and yells at you allowing your
team to hear. Your supervisor slams the door shut and severely criticizes you
saying how it’s not your place to try to lead the team and that the expectation in
this firm is that supervisors run their teams without interference from associates.
It is made clear that behavior like this in the future will not be tolerated and could
lead to termination. You attempt to speak, but you are interrupted and told to go
back to work.
The following was used in the low abusive supervision condition:
Your supervisor has a reputation of frequently making positive comments to the
team. During your conversation about the possible exposure, they immediately
become concerned and listen to you closely. You are complimented on your
handling of the situation and it's made clear that your actions should be copied by
others at the firm.
3.4.2.2. Mentoring relationship
This study contained two conditions for a mentoring relationship: (1) high and (2) low.
In the first condition, the vignette described a mentor that was external to the protégé’s
supervisory structure and one that exhibited mentoring behaviors as defined by Kram (1988).
The following was the high mentoring relationship condition:
Your firm does not have a formal mentoring system, but you receive mentoring
guidance from a supervisor in another division of your firm who went to your
university. You get together after work at a variety of social gatherings, which
have been very helpful in teaching you the “ins and outs” of the firm. While you
do not work directly with one another you routinely interact and discuss strategies
to help increase your visibility in the firm and make the best decisions about
sensitive issues.
In the condition where there was a low mentoring relationship the following was used:
Your firm does not have a formal mentoring system, but you receive mentoring
guidance from a supervisor in another division of your firm who went to your
university. You get together after work at a variety of social gatherings and share
the same attitude, values, and behaviors. While you do not work directly
together, you have become friends.
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3.4.2.3. Manipulation checks
After reading the vignette, two checks provided assurance the participants attended to the
conditions. Following previous literature for the abusive supervision conditions, three items
were selected from Tepper (2000)’s abusive supervision scale (Burton & Hoobler, 2006, 344).
Those three statements were: (1) “Your supervisor ridicules you,” (2) “Your supervisor is rude to
you,” and (3) Your supervisor puts you down in front of others.” To evaluate the mentoring
relationship conditions, three items were selected from the Ragins and and McFarlin (1990)
mentoring role scale. Those items were: (1) “Your mentor uses influence to support your
advancement in the firm,” (2) “Your mentor gives you advice on how to attain recognition in the
firm,” and (3) “You mentor suggests specific strategies for achieving your career aspirations.”
Participants responded to all six check items using a 7-point scale anchored at “Strongly
Disagree” and “Strongly Agree.”
3.5.

Participants
The participants for my study included graduate and undergraduate students at West

Virginia University in the College of Business and Economics. This sample was selected to
proxy for firm professionals, which is a strategy consistent with prior literature (Kaplan et al.,
2010). The participants were enrolled in at least one of the following six programs: (1) Online
Master of Business Administration, (2) Master of Business Administration, (3) Master of
Industrial Relations, (4) Master of Professional Accountancy, (5) Master of Science in Finance,
and (6) Bachelor of Science in Business Administration.33 Participants have knowledge of basic
financial information some have had exposure to working in firms via internships and prior work
experience. Participation in the study was voluntary, although monetary incentives were raffled,

33

Participants from the Bachelor of Science in Business Administration were enrolled in one of two separate
undergraduate accounting classes.
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which is appropriate for decision performance tasks (Awasthi & Pratt, 1990).34 Demographic
information, including age, gender, and work experience was collected to assist in interpretation
of the findings.
To determine the appropriate sample size for a study, a power analysis was conducted a
priori (Field, 2013, 70; Pedhazer & Schmelkin, 1991, 339). When employing an analysis of
variance (ANOVA), power is based on the number of cells in the study. To determine the
sample size four inputs are required: (1) α or the risk of incorrect rejection of the null, (2) β or
the risk of incorrect acceptance, where power is 1–β, (3) r, the effect size, and (4) the number of
tails.35 Alpha was set at the traditional level of 0.05, beta was set at 0.20 (1-β = a power of 0.80),
the effect size is 0.30.36 A one-tailed test was selected based on the direction of the hypotheses.
A conservative estimate of the sample was calculated to be 28 participants per cell (n=112).37
3.6.

Analysis method
The effects of the quasi-experimental design for abusive supervision and mentoring

relationship and their effects of willingness to voice are evaluated in a 2 (abusive supervision
high/low) × 2 (mentor relationship high/low) between subjects factorial analysis of variance
(ANOVA). The expected rank order of each cell is presented in Table 8.
[insert Table 8 here]
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Specifically, eight $25 gift cards and two $100 gift cards were raffled to participants who entered their email
address at the end of the survey.
35
Following Field’s (2013, 339) recommendation, I utilized the G*Power (2016) software package to determine the
sample size.
36
The effect size is conservatively set at 0.30, which was selected based on the effect sizes shown in prior studies
for abusive supervision, voicing, and mentoring. The smaller the effect size, the larger the sample must be to detect
the desired effect.
37
After pilot testing, another analysis was conducted with the initial effect size of 0.50. This calculation indicated
92 participants, 23 per cell, were needed to capture the desired effect size.
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3.6.1. Conditioning variables
In addition to the primary focus of my study, there are three additional conditioning
variables: (1) proactivity, (2) gender, and (3) organizational turnover intentions (OTI). No
formal hypotheses are stated. Bateman and Crant (1993) defined proactivity as a personality trait
where an individual is “relatively unconstrained by situational forces and who effects situational
change.” To measure proactivity, a ten-item measure from Batement and Crant (1993) was
incorporated into the materials prior to the vignette. One item measures of turnover intentions
and gender also were included. All measured variables are listed in Table 9 with a description.
The instrument materials are included in Appendix C.
[insert Table 9 here]
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4.

Analysis
My study investigated one research question: Does a mentoring relationship assist a

protégé to voice in an adverse situation with an abusive supervisor? I relied on three formally
stated hypotheses: (1) abusive supervision decreases the likelihood a protégé will voice a
violation of firm policies and procedures, (2) the existence of a mentoring relationship increases
the likelihood a protégé will voice a violation of firm policies and procedures, and (3) the
association between voicing and abusive supervision is moderated by the presence of a
mentoring relationship, such that the presence of a mentoring relationship increases the
likelihood of voicing a violation of firm policies and procedures. In this chapter, I describe the
data collection and statistical tests of the three hypotheses. I begin with a discussion of study
responses and demographics provided by the participants. Then I continue with the manipulation
check tests before concluding with the following three sections: (1) test of hypothesis one, (2)
test of hypothesis two, and (3) test of hypothesis three.
4.1.

Responses and demographics
To investigate how the abusive supervision condition (SUPR) and the mentor relationship

condition (MENT) impact a protégé’s voicing behaviors (VOICE) when a violation of policies
and procedures occurs Additionally, three conditioning variables proactivity (PROACT), gender
(GENDER), and organizational turnover intentions (OTI) were measured. This study required
participants with a basic knowledge of financial information and entry-level professional work
experience. In this section, I describe how the research instrument was administered, the number
of usable responses received, demographic information, and the demographic effects on the
study variables.
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4.1.1. Data collection
The research instrument was administered in three ways: (1) in emails to graduate
students, (2) in person during scheduled class time, and (3) a combination of 1 and 2. First,
separate emails were sent to master-level graduate students enrolled at West Virginia
University’s College of Business and Economics. Five graduate programs participated in the
study: (1) Online Master of Business Administration, (2) Master of Business Administration, (3)
Master of Professional Accountancy, (4) Master of Science in Finance, and (5) Master of Science
in Human Resources and Industrial Relations. The Master of Professional Accountancy students
received both an email and in-person recruitment. Two undergraduate classes from one
undergraduate program participated in the study: (1) Introductory Accounting Systems and (2)
Accounting Systems.38 Participants in the undergraduate classes were recruited during scheduled
class time. All study responses were collected using the survey-software Qualtrics®. All
participants were randomly assigned to one of the four vignettes.
4.1.2. Usable responses and demographic data
A total of 207 responses were collected and 28 (13.53%) were unusable. All 28 unusable
responses failed to complete the vignette portion of the instrument and were discarded. The final
sample contained 179 usable responses with a 52.0% response rate. Following the methodology
provided by Field (2013, 339), after pilot testing the total required sample was estimated to be 90
participants.39,40 The distribution of responses per cell are reported in Table 10. There were at
least 44 responses in each cell.

38

This sample was a convenience sample.
I used Field’s (2013, 339) recommendation to estimate the required sample size based on the effects size from a
pilot test utilizing the G*Power (2016) software package.
40
The observed power for the full model was 0.999. The observed power for SUPR was 0.765. The observed
power for MENT was 0.237. The observed power for the SUPR×MENT interaction was 0.093.
39
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[insert Table 10 here]
Of the 179 participants in the final sample, 59.8% (n=107) had 0-2 years of work
experience while 40.2% (n=72) had three or more years of work experience. 87.7% (n=157) of
respondents reported having: (1) a four-year degree in progress or (2) a four-year degree.
Female respondents accounted for 39.1% (n=70) of the sample. Most respondents, 63.1%
(n=113), reported previously witnessing a violation of policies and procedures in the workplace.
All demographic information collected for the participants is summarized in Table 11. The
average completion time for the instrument was seven minutes.41
[insert Table 11 here]
4.1.3. Demographic effects on variables
Five continuous variables were measured using participants’ responses: (1) VOICE, (2)
ABUSE, (3) MRELATE, (4) PROACT, and (5) OTI. A description of each model,
manipulation, and conditioning variable is presented in Table 9. T-tests and ANOVAs were used
to investigate whether participants’ demographics influenced responses. The results are
tabulated in Table 12 and Table 13.
Five dichotomous demographics were investigated for their effect on the five measured
variables. These demographics represent whether the participant: (1) was male or female, (2)
was assigned a mentor when starting at their firm, (3) developed a non-assigned mentor
relationship, (4) wanted a mentor, and (5) witnessed a past violation of policies and procedures.
The results of individual t-tests in Table 12 revealed four significant results.
[insert Table 12 here]
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The average completion time for all participants including unusable responses was one hour and thirteen minutes.
This time was driven by three participants who did not complete the study but left the browser open.
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First, the manipulation check variable ABUSE was significantly different depending on
whether the participant was assigned a mentor. Participants who were assigned a mentor had a
mean VOICE score of 3.196 while those not assigned a mentor had a VOICE score of 3.898.
Second, the conditioning variable PROACT was significantly different based on whether the
participant had: (1) developed a non-assigned mentor relationship and (2) witnessed a violation
of policies and procedures. Those participants who developed a non-assigned mentor
relationship had mean PROACT score of 5.620 compared to 5.383 for those who did not develop
a mentor relationship. Participants who witnessed a violation of policies and procedures had a
mean PROACT score of 5.658 compared to a score of 5.342 for the group who had not
witnessed any violations.
Five categorical demographic variables were investigated for their effect on the five
continuous variables. These demographics represent participant: (1) age, (2) class, (3) highest
degree attained, (4) years of work experience, and (5) firm size. The results of ANOVAs
indicated seven significant results, which are reported in Table 13.
[insert Table 13 here]
Firm size had a significant impact on: (1) MRELATE, (2) ABUSE, and (3) VOICE. This
effect was driven by those respondents in firms at the local-level. In those cases, the mean
scores of MRELATE, ABUSE, and VOICE were lower than the other groups. VOICE was
significant at the p < 0.100 level (Cohen, 1994). PROACT was significantly increased by
respondents who were older, had higher degrees, and had more work experience. Finally, OTI
showed a significant difference based on the age of the respondent. However, this effect is
driven by those ages 22-30 who had a mean OTI score of 3.66 compared to the average of 4.08.
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4.2.

Manipulation checks
Two variables, SUPR and MENT, were manipulated in this quasi-experiment. Each

manipulation had two levels: high and low. After reading the vignette, respondents answered six
statements, three relating to each condition, regarding the abusive supervisor and mentor
relationship. Each statement used a 7-point scale anchored from (1) Strongly Disagree to (7)
Strongly Agree. For each manipulation, the three items were averaged together to provide an
overall composite score. To determine whether the manipulations affected the respondents’
perception of abusive supervision and mentor relationship, ANOVA tests were conducted to
determine the significance of the manipulation on the composite measure. Details for each
manipulation follow.
4.2.1. Abusive supervision manipulation check
Using the three items described in Section 3.4.2.3. from Tepper’s (2000) abusive
supervision scale, I constructed the composite variable, ABUSE, to determine the participants’
assessment of the abusive supervisor manipulation. ABUSE was an average of the three SUPR
manipulation check items. An ANOVA was used to determine if the SUPR manipulation
influenced the participants’ mean ABUSE score.42 The mean ABUSE response was 3.699 (S.D.
= 2.135) on a 7-point scale where 7 was “Strongly Agree.” When the sample was divided
between the two levels of SUPR, the mean score for the high SUPR condition was 5.300 (S.D. =
1.671); the low SUPR score was 2.115 (S.D. = 1.121). The ANOVA test in Table 14 indicates
the effect of SUPR is significant (F = 224.729; p < .001).43 The manipulation was successful in
influencing the participants’ mean perception of abusive supervision in the vignette.

42

In general, three assumptions must be met to conduct an ANOVA: (1) independence of conditions, (2) normal
distributions of the residuals, and (3) homogeneity of variance. In this case and all others in this study, the
assumptions were met.
43
All individual measures of ABUSE were significant at conventional levels.
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[insert Table 14]
4.2.2. Mentor relationship manipulation check
Using the three items described in Section 3.4.2.3. from Ragins and McFarlin’s (1990)
mentor role scale, I constructed the composite variable, MRELATE, to determine the
participants’ assessment of the MENT manipulation. MRELATE was an average of the three
MENT manipulation check items. An ANOVA was used to answer if the MENT manipulation
influenced the participants’ mean MRELATE score. The mean MENT response was 4.605 (S.D.
1.385) on a 7-point scale where 7 is “Strongly Agree.” When the sample was divided between
the two levels of MENT, the mean score for the high MENT condition was 4.766 (S.D. = 1.269);
the low MENT score was 4.442 (S.D. = 1.481). The ANOVA test in Table 14 indicate the effect
of MENT was not significant (F = 2.477; p = 0.117).44 The manipulation was not successful in
influencing the respondents’ mean perception of a mentor relationship in the vignette.
4.3.

The dependent variable
Using the two items described in Section 3.4.1. from Nelson et al. (2016), I constructed

the composite variable, VOICE, to determine the overall voicing intentions of the participants.
The mean responses of VOICE are reported in Table 15. In untabulated results, the Pearson
correlation coefficient for SUPR and VOICE was -0.174 (p = 0.020).45 This coefficient
indicated a negative relationship between the SUPR and VOICE. The result indicates that when
SUPR moved from low to high, the VOICE score decreased. The Pearson correlation coefficient
for the MENT manipulation and VOICE was -0.114 (p = 0.129). This coefficient indicated there
was not a discernable difference from zero between MENT and VOICE.46 The Pearson
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Two of the individual measures of MENT were not discernable from zero. One measure was significant at the p <
0.100 level.
45
The two individual measures of VOICE were significant at conventional levels.
46
The two individual measures of VOICE were not discernable from zero.
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correlation coefficient for PROACT and VOICE was 0.355 (p < 0.001).47 This coefficient
indicated a positive relationship between the PROACT and VOICE. As PROACT increased so
too did VOICE. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the GENDER variable and VOICE was 0.085 (p = 0.260).48 Finally, the Pearson correlation coefficient for the OTI variable and VOICE
is -0.075 (p = 0.320).49
[insert Table 15]
4.4.

Test of H1
H1 stated that abusive supervision decreases the likelihood a protégé will voice a

violation of firm policies and procedures. If the independent variable SUPR had a significant
impact on the respondent’s voicing intentions, H1 would not be rejected. PROACT, OTI, and
GENDER also were tested and added as covariates into the model as necessary.
4.4.1. H1 analysis of covariance
To determine if VOICE was influenced by SUPR, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
test was used. The dependent measure was VOICE and the independent measure was SUPR.
Initially, three covariates were included: (1) PROACT, (2) GENDER, and (3) OTI. GENDER
and OTI showed no significant influence and were removed from the model. The ANCOVA
was used to answer if the SUPR manipulation influenced the respondents’ mean VOICE score
while controlling for PROACT. As shown in Table 15, Panel A, the mean VOICE score was
5.142 (S.D. = 1.361) on a 7-point scale where 7 was “Strongly Agree.” When the sample was
divided between the two levels of SUPR, the mean score for the high SUPR condition was 4.904
(S.D. = 1.535); the low SUPR score was 5.378 (S.D. = 1.125). Those results are reported in
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Individual component measures used to construct VOICE also exhibit significant correlations with PROACT.
Neither individual component measures used to construct VOICE exhibit correlations with GENDER.
49
Neither individual component measures used to construct VOICE exhibit correlations with OTI.
48
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Table 15, Panel B. The ANCOVA test in Table 16, Panel A indicated the effect of SUPR was
significant (F = 7.173; p = 0.008). H1 was not rejected.50
[insert Table 16]
4.5.

Test of H2
H2 stated that the existence of a mentoring relationship increases the likelihood a protégé

will voice a violation of firm policies and procedures. If MENT had a significant impact on
VOICE, H2 would not be rejected. PROACT, OTI, and GENDER also were tested and added as
covariates into the model as necessary.
4.5.1. H2 analysis of covariance
To determine if VOICE was affected by MENT, an ANCOVA test was used. The
dependent measure was VOICE; the independent measure was MENT. Initially, three covariates
were included: (1) PROACT, (2) GENDER, and (3) OTI. GENDER and OTI showed no
significant influence and were removed from the model. An ANCOVA was used to answer if
MENT influenced participants’ mean VOICE score while controlling for PROACT. When the
sample was divided between the two levels of MENT, the mean VOICE score for the high
MENT condition was 4.989 (S.D. = 1.420); the low MENT score was 5.298 (S.D. = 1.287).
Those results are reported in Table 15, Panel C. The ANCOVA test indicated the effect of
MENT is not significant (F = 1.425; p = 0.234). The MENT manipulation was not successful in
influencing the respondents’ mean voicing intentions. H2 was rejected.51 The results for the test
of H2 are presented in Table 16, Panel B.

50
51

The two individual measures of VOICE also were significant at conventional levels.
The two individual measures of VOICE also were not discernable from zero at conventional levels.
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4.6.

Test of H3
H3 stated that the association between voicing and abusive supervision is moderated by

the presence of a mentoring relationship, such that the presence of a mentoring relationship
increases the likelihood of voicing a violation of firm policies and procedures. If MENT had a
significant impact on VOICE when SUPR is high, H3 would not be rejected. In addition to H3,
PROACT, OTI and GENDER were tested and added as covariates into the model as necessary.
4.6.1. H3 analysis of covariance
To determine if VOICE was affected the interaction between MENT and SUPR, an
ANCOVA test was used. The dependent was VOICE. The independent measures were MENT
and SUPR. Initially, three covariates are included: (1) PROACT, (2) GENDER, and (3) OTI.
GENDER and OTI showed no significant influence and were removed from the model. An
ANCOVA was used to answer if the SUPR×MENT interaction influenced the participants’ mean
VOICE score. The effect of SUPR×MENT on VOICE was not significant (F = 0.588; p =
0.543). The SUPR×MENT interaction was not successful in influencing the respondents’ mean
voicing intentions. SUPR and MENT individually yielded qualitatively similar results to H1 and
H2. H3 was rejected.52 The ANCOVA results are reported in Table 16, Panel C.53,54
4.7.

Summary
The question this chapter analyzed was as follows: Does a mentoring relationship assist a

protégé to voice in an adverse situation with an abusive supervisor? Specifically, three formally
stated hypotheses were investigated: (1) abusive supervision decreases the likelihood a protégé

52

The two individual measures of VOICE also were not discernable from zero at conventional levels for the
interaction.
53
Untabulated supplemental analyses that included bootstrapping did not qualitatively alter the results presented.
54
Using only Online Master of Business Administration participants from the sample indicated a significant MENT
influence and MENT×SUPR interaction on VOICE. However, the SUPR manipulation was not discernable from
zero. The results are untabulated.
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will voice a violation of firm policies and procedures, (2) the existence of a mentoring
relationship increases the likelihood a protégé will voice a violation of firm policies and
procedures, and (3) the association between voicing and abusive supervision is moderated by the
presence of a mentoring relationship, such that the presence of a mentoring relationship increases
the likelihood of voicing a violation of firm policies and procedures. In this chapter, I
analytically investigated those three hypotheses. The results indicated H1 was supported while
H2 and H3 were rejected. In the next chapter, I discuss the implications of my study.
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5.

Discussion and conclusions
The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of abusive supervision on voicing

and whether this result is influenced by a mentor. The genesis for this study came from Mr.
Robert Boisjoly’s (1993) courageous account of how he voiced opposition to violations in safety
protocol before the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster on January 28, 1986. In Accounting
Horizons (1993), Mr. Boisjoly provided a firsthand narrative of suppressed voicing among his
colleagues in the presence of abusive supervision and enormous public pressure. Fundamentally,
Mr. Boisjoly depicted how ignoring the “elephant in the room” (i.e., disregarding a safety
protocol for rubber seals in cold temperatures) adversely affected the ability of NASA officials to
uphold quality standards and to exercise sound judgment to postpone the launch. In this
instance, ignoring the “elephant in the room” led to the tragic deaths of the Challenger crew and
a school teacher, Christa McAuliffe.
Similarly, the accounting profession is characterized by high-pressure work environments
and a litany of quality standards that must be maintained to uphold the public’s trust (Russell et
al., 2016). Tepper et al. (2006) showed that the presence of abusive supervision in the workplace
can make firms susceptible to negative outcomes (e.g., absenteeism, increased turnover, legal
costs, lower organizational commitment). However, in contrast to abusive supervision, a rich
literature has shown that mentoring can provide positive outcomes (e.g., increased organizational
commitment, job satisfaction, and self-esteem). Mentoring is a unique relationship between a
more experienced mentor and a less experienced protégé. Further, a mentor-protégé relationship
is one where the mentor provides career and psychosocial support to the protégé. Mr. Boisjoly
touched on the importance of creating such relationships that foster support in the workplace.
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Through voicing, an accounting firm’s personnel can maintain quality by addressing issues
before they become catastrophic.
To study the effect of abusive supervision and mentoring on voicing, I developed three
hypotheses. Based on Tepper (2000) and Mackey et al. (2015), I predicted that an abusive
supervisor would decrease a protégé’s willingness to voice a violation of policies and
procedures. A second hypothesis was developed based on Kram (1983) and Dalton et al. (2015).
For this hypothesis, I predicted a mentoring relationship would increase voicing by a protégé
when there is a violation of policies and procedures. Accordingly, the third hypothesis tested the
interaction between abusive supervision and mentoring on voicing. To operationalize the study,
I employed a 2×2 quasi-experiment design by manipulating both an abusive supervisor
(high/low) and a mentor relationship (high/low). The dependent variable, voice, was a two-item
response measured on a seven-point scale. Four treatment conditions were randomized in a
vignette that placed the participants in a firm where a colleague may have exposed client data.
Participants consisted of a sample of graduate and undergraduate students who proxied for
accountants. Responses were captured through the online software Qualtrics® using both inperson and remote data collection.
Central to the development of the vignette was the AICPA’s framework for quality, as
outlined in SQCS No. 8 (AICPA, 2012). Specifically, SQCS No. 8 was foundational to
providing the proper organizational context for my study. Three key elements from SQCS No. 8
coincide and are relevant to the variables of interest in this study. The first element, engagement
performance, described the supervisor’s responsibilities in maintaining legal, regulatory, and
ethical requirements. A second element, monitoring, addressed how a concern that is voiced
should be dealt with internally by the firm. The human resources element required establishing
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competency, capability, and ethics among the firm’s personnel. SQCS No. 8 noted that
competency, capability, and ethics could be achieved specifically through mentoring.
The primary finding in this study indicated that abusive supervision decreased voicing
when there was a potential violation of policies and procedures. This finding is theoretically
consistent with the extant literature. Tepper (2000) defined abusive supervision and found
negative consequences associated with this construct. In a separate study, Tepper et al. (2006)
also highlighted negative economic consequences from abusive supervision of approximately
$23.8 billion annually in the United States. My findings also are consistent with recent analyses
by Mackey et al. (2015). Through a meta-analysis, Mackey et al. (2015) found that the outcomes
of abusive supervision were almost entirely negative. In sum, the presence of abusive
supervision in accounting firms can have adverse behavioral and economic consequences.
In this study, it was expected that a mentor providing career support would influence a
protégé’s decision to voice. I did not find evidence that a mentoring relationship affected
voicing behavior. Mentoring can provide two basic functions: (1) career support and (2)
psychosocial support (Kram, 1983). Dirsmith et al. (2015) also described how mentors assist
protégés in navigating difficult situations within public accounting firms. Although the
quantitative results of the quasi-experiment provided insignificant results on the effects of
mentoring, participants’ responses to open-ended questions provided evidence that participants
understood the role of a mentor. Responses were consistent with prior work on mentoring both
inside and outside the accounting context (i.e., Dirsmith et al., 2015; Kram, 1983). These
responses provided affirmation mentors are used as sounding boards, give firm insights, career
support, psychosocial support, and guidance in difficult situations. For instance, one participant
described a mentor as:
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Someone who takes the time to review my work product when I ask, offers
constructive criticism, shares what they have learned from their own experiences
and mistakes to help me prevent some of my own, shares their time with me, has
an interest in my success…
Taken together, mentor is still a relevant variable to examine in an abusive work environment
that is characterized by abusive supervision, despite the nonsignificant findings for my second
and third hypotheses.
5.1.

Contributions
In this study, I contributed to both the accounting and management literatures by

demonstrating that abusive supervision lowers voicing, which can compromise quality. Voicing
and abusive supervision have not been studied together in the management or accounting
literatures. Voicing can lead to increased quality in the firm by providing managers with the
knowledge a problem exists. Within the accounting literature, I extend work begun by Nelson et
al. (2016) in voicing and Dalton et al. (2015) with respect to abusive supervision by
characterizing the direct supervisor as abusive or not-abusive. Uniquely, my study examined
how participants responded after a discussion about a potential violation of policies and
procedures with an abusive supervisor. Not only is the direct supervisor important to voicing
behavior, but I demonstrate the nature of supervision also is relevant and can potentially have an
adverse effect on the firm’s performance and quality.
I also provide an initial methodological contribution by testing a mentor manipulation on
voicing behavior. As noted by Allen et al. (2008) and Scandura and Pelligrini (2010), mentoring
research suffers from a lack of experimental methodologies. Although the mentor manipulation
did not yield a significant finding in this study, the participants’ responses to open-ended
questions concerning the role of a mentor provided rich evidence for future research and a clear
avenue for methodological improvement.
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5.2.

Limitations
Three limitations constrain the interpretation of results for this study. The sampling,

experimental design, mentor manipulation, and fatigue limit the interpretation of the findings.
The first limitation is the sampling used in the study. The participants in this research were all
enrolled at a single university and included undergraduate students. While previous research in
accounting has used undergraduate students to conduct experiments, many of the participants
had not previously developed a mentor relationship in a work setting.55
The use of a quasi-experimental design does not provide the level of internal validity a
controlled laboratory setting can provide. However, the approach allowed for the engagement of
Master of Business Administration participants enrolled in online classes. These participants had
greater work experience who would otherwise be inaccessible. This design implementation
allows for greater external validity (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). The use of a vignette does
weaken external validity. By asking participants to make decisions based on a scenario rather
than actual circumstances, some realism is lost.
The mentor manipulations treatment did not function as anticipated. This result could be
because the manipulation was not strong enough, the manipulation check did not sufficiently
capture the effects of the manipulation, or a combination of both. The manipulation used in this
study will need to be further investigated and refined to allow for more interpretable results.
Future research could consider utilizing the counseling subscale of the mentor role scale to better
detect differences in the mentor relationship conditions.k
Finally, 28 participants started the survey but did not finish. There were no differences
between groups when dividing groups based on median completion time. However, with 28
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When comparing results based on whether participants had developed a mentor relationship or not, there were no
discernable differences in responses to voicing.
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participants beginning but not completing the study, fatigue may have been a factor biasing the
responses of the instrument.
5.3.

Suggestions for future research
From this study, there are several suggestions for future research. Researchers in

accounting could further narrow in on the abusive supervision voice relationship. Other factors
may mediate or moderate the relationship. For instance, recent management literature suggests
that professionals with high self-leadership may be less phased by abusive supervisors
(Houghton, Dawley, & DiLiello, 2012; Mackey et al., 2016). This suggestion can also be
applied to the accounting literature allowing future research to consider the moderating effect of
self-leadership. Additionally, organizational-professional conflict is a construct that has been
tied to reduced organizational commitment and other negative workplace behaviors including
organizational turnover intentions in the accounting setting (Brierley, 1998). Future research in
accounting could benefit from an investigation into whether the abusive supervision-voicing
relationship is mediated by organizational-professional conflict. By reducing abusive
supervision in the workplace, firms can limit costs and improve performance. However,
researchers could explore how abusive supervision directly impacts firm costs from an archival
perspective. By using a multi-method approach, researchers could triangulate the factors
associated with voicing, abusive supervision, and mentoring.
Finally, researchers could benefit from an established voicing scale, which would
contribute to the accounting, management, and psychology literatures. Along with Nelson et al.
(2016) my study furthers voicing in the accounting literature. Most studies in accounting use
whistleblowing. By focusing on voicing and developing a validated scale, researchers and
practitioners examine how to improve situations before they spiral to a point where
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whistleblowing is needed. Voicing allows researchers to focus on improvements to the firm and
firm performance.
5.4.

Conclusion
Mr. Boisjoly recommended the only way to effectively bring change in the presence

violations of policies and procedures was to voice. Mr. Boisjoly’s own experience exposed the
potential threats when violations to policies and procedures are unaddressed. My study shows
that an abusive supervisor decreases voicing in the accounting setting. The finding is
theoretically consistent with the existing management literature on both abusive supervision and
voicing. This finding contributes to the accounting profession by presenting evidence that
accounting firms with abusive supervision can have a detrimental impact to quality.
Through voicing, a firm can maintain quality by addressing issues before they become
catastrophic. Thus, by suppressing voicing, abusive supervision places firms at risk
unnecessarily. Mr. Boisjoly’s timeless Accounting Horizons (1993) article examined the
negative effects violations of policies and procedures can have on quality. Whether in
accounting or any other profession, violations of policies and procedures that are unaddressed
can have lasting negative consequences. Sometimes even addressing the elephant in the room
cannot affect change in the firm. However, as Mr. Boisjoly (1993, 59) stated, “Voice is the
option chosen by those who are willing to stand up for ethical principals in the belief that change
will result.”
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Appendix A – Tables
Table 1
Elements of Statement on Quality Control Standard (SQCS) No. 8.
SQCS No. 8 element Brief description
1. Engagement
performance

Ensure consistency, supervision responsibilities, and review
responsibilities. When difficult issues arise, consultations occur and
are documented. Quality control reviews should occur according to
policies and procedures.

2. Ethical
requirements

The AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct (AICPA, 2016a) is
reinforced through leadership, training, monitoring, and dealing with
noncompliance. Independence is always key.

3. Human
resources

Maintain sufficient personnel levels. Ensuring personnel has
competence, capabilities, and commitment. Ensuring those abilities
increase for personnel as the move up within the firm. Increase
abilities through education, training, experience, and mentoring.

4. Leadership

Promote an internal culture that quality is essential. Leaders assume
the ultimate responsibility.

5. Monitoring

Assess and remediate deficiencies. Provide reasonable assurance that
complaints and allegations are dealt with appropriately.

6. Relationships

To accept or continue a relationship firms much be competent in the
area, comply with all ethical requirements, and consider client integrity.

Source: AICPA (2012)
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Table 2
Summary of relevant abusive supervision literature.
Reference

Method Research
design

Sample

Key findings

Tepper (2000)

S

Perception of
abusive
supervision at
two time points

Residents of a mediumsized Midwestern city.
T1 n=712, 53.0%
response rate; T2
n=362; 50.8% response
rate

Defines the abusive supervision construct, develops a
measure, and examines its consequences. Findings indicate
the abusive supervision leads to dysfunctional consequences,
experiences with injustice affect reactions to abusive
supervision, and consequences are more prominent for those
with less job mobility.

Tepper et al.
(2006)

S

Field survey of
both
supervisors and
subordinate
perceptions.

National Guard
members and military
supervisors 334 dyads

Supervisors’ depression mediates the relationship between
procedural justice and the subordinates’ perceptions of
abusive supervision. Between 10%-16% of employees are
subjected to abusive supervision at a cost of $17,000-$24,000
per serious incident through absenteeism, legal costs, reduced
productivity, and turnover. $23.8 billion annually in the U.S.

Tepper (2007)

R

Analysis of
abusive
supervision

All abusive supervision
literature from 20002007

Provides an initial review of the abusive supervision
construct including antecedents and consequences.
Additionally, the review offers an emergent research model
based on abusive supervision studies.

Mawritz et al.
(2012)

S

Measures
perceptions of
abusive
supervision,
hostile work
climate

U.S. employees working Abusive supervision has a trickledown effect from managers
more than 20 hours per
to supervisors to employees. The results are exacerbated
week (n=383 work
when there is a higher hostile workplace climate.
pairs; 75.2% response
rate)

Martinko et al.
(2013)

R

Analysis of
abusive
supervision

Research focused from
2008-2012 with a brief
overview of 2000-2007
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Reviews abusive supervision literature from 2008-2012,
Tepper's (2007) model, and distinguishes between abusive
supervisory perceptions and abusive supervisory behavior.

Reference

Method Research
design

Sample

Mackey et al.
(2015)

M

112 studies with 140
Indicates that abusive supervision is almost universally
independent samples
negative. The authors suggest examining abusive supervision
investigating the abusive in other contexts to fully understand the construct.
supervision construct

Statistical
analysis of the
correlates to
abusive
supervision

Key findings

M = meta-analysis, R = review, S = survey.
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Table 3
Outcomes of abusive supervision.
Outcome

Definition

Reference

Emotional
exhaustion

Emotional and physical strain
resulting from stressors in the
workplace characterized as lack
of energy and a feeling that
one’s emotional resources are
used up.

Breaux et al. (2008, 144)

Workplace
aggression

Any form of behavior that is
intended to harm employees of
an organization or the
organization itself.

Burton & Hoobler (2011, 390)

Family well-being

The degree of satisfaction with
one’s family of origin and the
constituent relationships that
are imbedded.

Carlson et al. (2011, 941)

Resistance

Non-conformance to a
supervisor's attempts at
influence.

Tepper et al. (2001, 975)

Source: Martinko et al. (2013)
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Table 4
Summary of relevant voicing literature.
Reference

Method Research
design

Sample

Contribution

Hirschman
(1970)

C

Anecdotal evidence

Introduced and defined the concepts exit, voice, and loyalty.

Nader et al.
(1972)

C

Collection of
whistleblowing
accounts

Anecdotal evidence

Introduced whistleblowing to a mass audience.

Parmerlee et
al. (1982)

S

Respondents
described the
circumstances,
resolution, and
reactions of
organizations

Women who filed a
complaint with the
Wisconsin Equal Rights
Division (n=73; 50%
response rate)

Studied whistleblowing correlates establishing retaliation was
more likely for those respondents more valued by the
organization (e.g., age, experience, education) and those who
lacked public support.

Near & Miceli
(1985)

C

Evaluation of
the
whistleblowing
process

Anecdotal evidence

Established the academic definition of whistleblowing by
developing a model of the whistleblowing process.

Arnold (1993)

C

Introduction of Anecdotal evidence
Robert Boisjoly
to the
accounting
literature

Introduce Robert Boisjoly and offer commentary to the
necessity of Boisjoly (1993).

Boisjoly
(1993)

C

Evaluate the
Challenger
launch decision
and subsequent
investigation

Introduced exit, voice, and loyalty to the accounting literature
with a firsthand narrative.

Anecdotal evidence
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Reference

Method Research
design

Sample

Contribution

MesmerMagnus &
Viswesvaran,
2005

M

A statistical
analysis of the
correlates of
whistleblowing

21 studies with 26
independent samples
investigating
whistleblowing

Conduct a meta-analysis of whistleblower characteristics,
whistleblowing correlates, and retaliation characteristics.

Rehg et al.,
(2008)

S

A survey that
focused on
retaliation after
whistleblowing

Air Force civilian
employees and activeduty military (n=3,288;
33.2% response rate)

Females perceived greater retaliation; low power and lack of
support were also associated with greater perceived
retaliation. Retaliation was negatively related to the
subordinates’ relationship with the supervisor.

Kaplan et al.,
(2010)

E

A2×2
experiment
where fraud
type and social
confrontation
are manipulated

MBA students (n=96)
completed the
instrument with 77
correctly responding to
the manipulation checks

Employees experiencing an unsuccessful social confrontation
are more likely to seek out powerful internal report recipients
(supervisor’s supervisor rather than an internal auditor). The
type of fraud did not influence the participants’ intentions to
report.

Seifert et al.,
(2010)

E

A2×2×2
experiment
manipulating
procedures,
management
interactions,
and outcomes

Subjects were internal
auditors or management
accountants (n=447;
16.7% response rate)

Found whistleblowing policies and mechanisms
incorporating higher levels of procedural, distributive, and
interactional justice were perceived to increase the likelihood
that an accountant would internally report a financial
statement fraud.

Analysis of the
voicing
literature

A review of the
Discuss the definition and development of the voice
theoretical framework of construct. Discussion includes the outcomes, mediators,
voicing
moderators, and future research, which should address a need
for more context.

Bashshur & Oc R
(2015)
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Reference

Method Research
design

Sample

Contribution

Gao et al.
(2015)

E

A2×2×2×2
experiment
manipulating
reporting
channel,
bystander,
power status,
and case

U.S. business students
(n=369) proxy for
lower-level employees

The presence of bystanders reduces the likelihood of the
intent to whistleblow. An external reporting channel reduces
the bystander effect.

Nelson et al.
(2016)

E

5 studies. 1
survey and 4
experiments
using both
betweensubjects and
within-subjects
designs

Audit staff from two
large public accounting
firms. S1 n=197, 53.0%
response rate; E1
n=114; E2 n=31; E3
n=41; E4 n=114

First to examine employee voice in the accounting literature.
Auditors’ willingness to address audit issues is affected by
how they think their message will be received.
Consequences were not attributable to willingness to speak
up.

C = commentary, E = experimental, M = meta-analysis, R = review, S = survey.
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Table 5
Summary of relevant mentoring literature.
Reference

Method Research design Sample

Contribution

Kram (1983)

CA

Two separate
interviews with
protégés their
identified
mentors

18 pairs of
mentors/protégés from a
northeastern public
utility

Identifies how a mentor/protégé relationship progresses
through several phases in both career and psychosocial
functions.

Dirsmith &
Covaleski
(1985)

CA

Semi-structured
in-depth
interviews

110 individuals at large
public accounting firms

Qualitatively examine how non-formal communications, such
as mentoring, in accounting firms influence the control system
environment.

Kram (1988)

C

Olian et al.
(1988)

E

Three betweensubject
experiments
manipulating
mentor
interpersonal
competence,
gender, age,
and
organizational
network

Undergraduate students
E1 n=167; E2 n=271; E3
n=238

Examine the protégé attraction to a mentor relationship. The
findings indicate the mentor’s interpersonal competence
influences protégé attraction. The mentor’s work experience,
age, and gender did not have a consistent influence across the
studies.

Olian et al.
(1993)

E

A2×2×2×2
experiment
manipulating
protégé
performance,
gender, marital
status, and
mentor gender

145 banking industry
managers

Examine the mentor/protégé relationship from the mentor’s
perspective. Mentors expected greater rewards when the
protégé had better past performance and were more willing to
mentor when (1) males protégés were married and (2) female
protégés were single.

Discusses the mentor/protégé relationship in organizations.
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Reference

Method Research design Sample

Contribution

Viator (1999)

S

Survey of
barriers to
obtaining a
mentor, mentor
demographics,
formal
mentorship, and
turnover
intentions

CPAs in large public
accounting firms
(n=723; 24.1% response
rate)

Examines protégé’s barriers to obtaining a mentor in an
accounting context finding when the mentor and protégé had
no input in the pairing decision, satisfaction was lower.

Viator (2001)

S

Survey
examining
formal and
informal
mentoring

CPAs in large public
accounting firms
(n=794; 26.5% response
rate)

Establishes that informal mentoring is associated with reduced
role ambiguity. Informal mentoring relationships are likely to
have stronger bonding and commitment when compared to
formal mentors.

Allen et al.
(2004)

M

A statistical
analysis of
career benefits
associated with
mentor versus
non-mentor
group

43 studies across
disciplines

Meta-analysis of career and psychosocial benefits associated
with mentoring solidifying mentoring theory in the literature.

Payne &
Huffman
(2005)

S

Survey
examining how
mentors affect
protégés
commitment
over two time
periods

US Army officers. Two
time periods (n=1,334;
63% response rate; 51%
response rate)

Establishes that formal mentors increase a protégé’s affective
commitment to the organization. Protégés have higher levels
of commitment one year after being mentored. The type of
mentoring relationship influences affective commitment and
role ambiguity.
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Reference

Method Research design Sample

Contribution

Viator &
Pasework
(2005)

S

Survey to
examine how
structural
separation of
the
mentor/protégé
relationship

CPAs likely to have
prior mentoring
relationships (n=707;
38.0% response rate)

Both modern and Greco-Roman models of mentoring exist in
accounting. Finds increased levels of mentor tension postformal mentor relationship especially when both remain in the
same organization.

Dalton et al.
(2015)

S

Survey to
examine how
unfavorable
supervisory
feedback affects
accountants

CPAs employed at large
public accounting firms
(n=421; 17.9% response
rate)

Find that mentors reduce the negative effects of unfavorable
supervisory feedback (USF) for protégés. USF is associated
with lower job satisfaction and role clarity, which is associated
with lower organizational commitment and higher turnover
intentions.

Dirsmith et al.
(2015)

C/R

Analysis of
qualitative
research
methods in
accounting

Exploration of
qualitative research
through the past 30 years
in accounting

Discuss the mutual benefits and costs of the mentor/protégé
pair.

Taylor &
Curtis (2016)

S

Survey to
examine
mentoring and
whistleblowing

US public accountants
(n=120)

Quality mentoring relationships and positive ethical climates
relate to increased whistleblowing.

C = commentary, CA = content analysis, E = experimental, M = meta-analysis, R = review, S = survey.
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Table 6
Research hypotheses.
Alternative hypotheses

Null hypotheses

H1

Abusive supervision decreases the
likelihood a protégé will voice a
violation of firm policies and procedures.

Abusive supervision has no effect on the
likelihood a protégé will voice a violation
of firm policies and procedures.

H2

The existence of a mentoring relationship
increases the likelihood a protégé will
voice a violation of firm policies and
procedures.

The existence of a mentoring relationship
has no effect on the likelihood a protégé
will voice a violation of firm policies and
procedures.

H3

The association between voicing and
abusive supervision is moderated by the
existence of a mentoring relationship,
such that the existence of a mentoring
relationship increases the likelihood of
voicing a violation of firm policies and
procedures.

The association between voicing and
abusive supervision is moderated by the
existence of a mentoring relationship,
such that the existence of a mentoring
relationship has no effect on the
likelihood of voicing a violation of firm
policies and procedures.
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Table 7
Experimental conditions.
Variables

High abusive supervision

Low abusive supervision

High
mentor

Cell 1: A mentoring relationship
exists; there is abusive supervision.

Cell 2: A mentoring relationship exists;
there is no abusive supervision.

Low
mentor

Cell 3: A mentoring relationship
does not exist; there is abusive
supervision.

Cell 4: A mentoring relationship does not
exist; there is not abusive supervision.
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Table 8
Expected voicing rank by cell.56
Expected rank57

Cell

Cell description

1

Cell 2

A mentoring relationship is high; there is low abusive supervision.

2

Cell 4

A mentoring relationship is low; there is low abusive supervision.

2

Cell 1

A mentoring relationship is high; there is high abusive supervision.

4

Cell 3

A mentoring relationship is low; there is high abusive supervision.

56
57

The cell number is from Table 7.
Highest (1) to lowest (4) expected scores on the VOICE composite measure.
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Table 9
Experimental variables.
Panel A: Model variables
Variable name

Construct

Description

MENT

Mentor relationship

A dichotomous variable coded 1 for a high
mentor relationship and 0 for a low mentor
relationship.

SUPR

Abusive supervision

A dichotomous variable coded 1 for a high
abusive supervisor and 0 for a low abusive
supervisor.

VOICE

Voicing intentions

A continuous variable between 1 and 7 measured
as the score representing the degree to which the
participant is willing to voice in the workplace.
It is the average of 2 items.

Panel B: Conditioning variables
PROACT

Proactivity

A continuous variable between 1 and 7 measured
as the score representing the degree to which the
respondent is proactive in the workplace. It is
the average of the 10-item proactivity scale
responses.

OTI

Organizational
turnover intentions

A continuous variable between 1 and 7 measured
as the score representing the degree to which the
respondent would seek alternate employment
within 6 months.

GENDER

Gender

A variable where 0 is female and 1 is male.

Panel C: Manipulation check variables
MRELATE

Mentor relationship

A continuous variable between 1 and 7 measured
as the score representing the perception of a
mentor a mentor relationship. It is the average of
three items.

ABUSE

Abusive supervision

A continuous variable between 1 and 7 measured
as the score representing the perception of an
abusive supervisor. It is the average of three
items.

Panel A includes the model variables and their descriptions. Panel B includes the conditioning
variables and descriptions. Panel C is a description on the manipulation check variables.
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Table 10
Responses per cell in a 2 × 2 design.
Cell totals

High abusive supervision

Low abusive supervision

Total

High mentor

44

46

90

Low mentor

45

44

89

Totals

89

90

179

Sample sizes in each of the four experimental condition.
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Table 11
Participant demographic information.
Category
N

Percentage of participants

Age
18-22

87

48.6%

23-30

53

29.6%

31-40

33

18.4%

41-64

5

2.8%

65+

0

0.0%

Male

109

60.9%

Female

70

39.1%

High School

22

12.3%

Associate

7

3.9%

4-year

64

35.8%

Master

74

41.3%

Doctorate

12

6.7%

Gender

Highest Degree

Work Experience (years)
0-2

107

59.8%

3-5

25

14.0%

6-10

24

13.4%

11-14

12

6.7%

15+

11

6.1%
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Category

N

Percentage of participants

Firm size
Big 4

11

6.1%

National

36

20.1%

Regional

33

18.4%

Local

15

8.4%

Not Applicable

76

42.5%

Other

8

4.5%

Undergraduate

73

40.7%

Graduate

106

59.3%

Class

Were assigned a mentor at their firm
Yes

51

28.5%

No

128

71.5%

Developed a non-assigned mentor relationship
Yes

120

67.0%

No

59

33.0%

Yes

149

83.2%

No

30

16.8%

Wants a mentor

Witnessed policies and procedures violation
Yes

113

63.1%

No

66

36.9%

Demographic information responses. This table includes the number of responses for each
category and the percentages.
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Table 12
Effects of demographics on response variables.
Variable

Assign
mentor

Develop
mentor

Gender

P&P
violation

Want mentor

MRELATE

-1.018

-0.731

0.997

-0.289

0.203

ABUSE

2.003*

-0.115

-0.253

-0.635

-.932

VOICE

-1.063

-1.041

1.130

0.011

-0.334

PROACT

-0.300

-2.000**

-0.801

-2.765**

-1.621

OTI

3.025**

-0.700

-0.507

-0.092

-0.547

*

p-value < 0.100
p-value < 0.010
This tables shows the F-statistic results between dichotomous variables and the model and
control variables. The F-statistic tests: H0: the dichotomous demographic has no effect on the
continuous variable. Assign mentor was a dichotomous variable where 0 was if the participant
did not have an assigned mentor and 1 if the participant did. Develop mentor was a dichotomous
variable where 0 was if the participant did not have a developed mentor and 1 if the participant
did. Gender was a dichotomous variable where 0 was if the participant was female and 1 if the
participant was male. P&P violation was a dichotomous variable where 0 was if the participant
had not witnessed a policies and procedures violation in the workplace and 1 if the participant
had witnessed one. Want mentor was a dichotomous variable where 0 was if the participant did
not want a mentor and 1 if the participant did.
**
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Table 13
Effects of demographics on response variables.
Variable

Age

Class

Degree

Firm size

Work years

MRELATE

0.426

0.002

1.024

2.371**

.587

ABUSE

1.400

-0.004

1.086

2.481**

0.752

VOICE

0.071

0.022

0.763

2.048*

1.016

PROACT

6.789***

0.135

3.886***

1.740

5.323***

OTI

2.447*

-0.005

0.305

0.806

1.801

*

p-value < 0.100
p-value < 0.050
***
p-value < 0.010
This tables shows the T-test results between categorical variables and the model and control
variables. T-test statistic tests: H0: the categorical variable has no effect on the continuous
variable. Age was the participant age. Class was the program or class the participant was
enrolled. Degree was the highest degree the participant earned even if it was still in progress.
Firm size indicated the size of the firm the participant where the participant was employed.
Work years was the amount of time the participant had worked.
**
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Table 14
ANOVA tests of the manipulation checks.
Model

Source

Sum of
squares

Degrees of
freedom

Mean
square

F-value

Pr > F

ABUSE

Model

453.875

1

453.875

224.729

<0.001

Error

2.020

177

2.020

4.710

1

4.710

2.477

0.117

336.509

177

336.509

MRELATE Model
Error

This table shows the ANOVA results of the two manipulations MENT and SUPR. The ABUSE
model shows if there is a significant difference of the composite measure ABUSE at the two
levels of the SUPR manipulation. The MRELATE model shows if there is a significant
difference of the composite measure MRELATE at the two levels of the MENT manipulation.

84

Table 15
Voicing responses and statistics.
Panel A: Responses to voicing measurements
Variable

Mean

Standard
deviation

VOICE

5.142

1.361

Panel B: VOICE responses to SUPR manipulation
High abusive supervision

Low abusive supervision

Variable

Mean

Standard
deviation

Mean

Standard
deviation

VOICE

4.904

1.535

5.378

1.125

Panel C: VOICE responses to MENT manipulation
High mentor relationship

Low mentor relationship

Variable

Mean

Standard
deviation

Mean

Standard
deviation

VOICE

4.989

1.420

5.298

1.287

Panel A shows the mean response and standard deviation of the dependent variable VOICE.
Panel B shows the mean response and standard deviation of the dependent variable VOICE on
conditions of the SUPR manipulation. Panel C shows the mean response and standard deviation
of the dependent variable VOICE on conditions of the MENT manipulation.
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Table 16
The effect of MENT, SUPR, and MENT ×SUPR on VOICE.
Panel A: The effect of SUPR on VOICE.
Variable

Source

Sum of squares

Degrees of freedom Mean square

F-value

Pr > F

VOICE

Model

51.878

2

25.939

16.437

<0.000

Intercept

7.831

1

7.831

4.962

0.027

PROACT

41.855

1

41.855

26.523

<0.000

SUPR

11.319

1

11.319

7.173

0.008

Error

277.739

176

1.578

Panel B: The effect of MENT on VOICE
VOICE

Model

42.881

2

21.441

13.160

<0.000

Intercept

9.154

1

9.154

5.619

0.019

PROACT

38.612

1

38.612

23.700

<0.000

MENT

2.321

1

2.321

1.425

0.234

Error

286.736

176

1.629

Panel C: The effect of SUPR×MENT on VOICE
VOICE

Model

54.935

2

13.734

8.700

<0.000

Intercept

8.775

1

8.775

5.588

0.020

PROACT

39.161

1

39.161

24.807

<0.000

SUPR

11.486

1

11.486

7.276

0.008

MENT

2.468

1

2.468

1.563

0.380

SUPR×M
ENT

0.588

1

0.588

0.372

0.543

Error

274.682

174

1.579

Panels A, B, and C present the ANCOVA results for H1, H2, and H3, respectively.
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Table 17
VOICE rank and statistics by experimental condition.
Actual rank

Expected rank

Mean

Standard deviation

Cell description

1

1

5.625

1.035

A mentoring relationship is
high; there is low abusive
supervision.

2

2

5.141

1.167

A mentoring relationship is
low; there is low abusive
supervision.

3

4

4.978

1.434

A mentoring relationship is
low; there is high abusive
supervision.

4

2

4.830

1.642

A mentoring relationship is
high; there is high abusive
supervision.

This table shows the mean response and standard deviation of the dependent variable VOICE on
each experimental condition. The expected rank column shows the a priori rank by condition.
The actual rank is the high (1) to low (4) rank of the VOICE measure.
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Appendix B – Figure
Figure 1
Research model.
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐶𝑇
𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐶𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑅 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑈𝑃𝑅×𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽4 [𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅 ] + 𝜖
𝑂𝑇𝐼
This figure shows research model where VOICE is the dependent variable, which is a composite measure of two-items to indicate
voicing intentions. There are two independent variables: (1) SUPR and (2) MENT. SUPR is the abusive supervisor manipulation and
MENT is the mentor relationship manipulation. Three conditioning variables are included: (1) PROACT, (2) GENDER, and (3) OTI,
which are proactivity, gender, and organizational turnover intentions, respectively.
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Appendix C – Instrument

89

90

91

The following vignette was used to represent high abusive supervision and a low mentoring
relationship:58

58

Language mentioning the type of vignette was not included in the instrument. It is presented for the informational
purposes of the reader.
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The following vignette was used to represent low abusive supervision and a low mentoring
relationship:59

59

Language mentioning the type of vignette was not included in the instrument. It is presented for the informational
purposes of the reader.
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The following vignette was used to represent high abusive supervision and a high mentoring
relationship:60

60

Language mentioning the type of vignette was not included in the instrument. It is presented for the informational
purposes of the reader.

94

The following vignette was used to represent low abusive supervision and a high mentoring
relationship:61

61

Language mentioning the type of vignette was not included in the instrument. It is presented for the informational
purposes of the reader.
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98
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